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CHAPTER 19 
Zoning and Land Use 
RICHARD G. HUBER* 
A. ZoNING 
§19.1. Exclusionary Zoning. In Wilson v. Town of Sherborn, 1 the 
Massachusetts Appeals Court sustained the validity of a two-acre 
minimum zoning· requirement. 2 The case raises the issue, faced by 
other state and federal courts in recent years, of whether zoning pro-
visions that effectively exclude significant segments of an area's popu-
lation from parts of a municipality are valid exercises of a 
community's police power. Several states, notably New Jersey3 and 
Pennsylvania,4 have held such regulations to be unconstitutional on 
due process and equal protection grounds. Wilson, however, reveals 
the unsatisfactory nature of these approaches and suggests that the 
appropriate resolution may be legislative rather than judicial. 5 
Exclusionary land use controls are those regulations "which appear 
to interfere seriously with the availability of low- and moderate-cost 
housing where it is needed."6 Building and housing codes may have 
exclusionary effects, but the most common devices are restrictive zon-
ing provisions. These include minimum building requirements, the 
exclusion of multiple dwellings, restrictions on bedroom numbers, 
prohibition of mobile homes, frontage requirements, and large lot re-
quirements. In addition, restrictions on subdivision control, site plan 
approval, and cluster zoning often result in increased costs for indi-
vidual housing units. While the special permit requirements may allow 
*RICHARD G. HUBER is Dean and Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. The 
author wishes to acknowledge the extensive help of Mary Holland, a second-year stu-
dent at Boston College Law School, in the preparation of this chapter. 
§19.1. 1 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 643, 326 N.E.2d 922. 
2 !d. at 655, 326 N.E.2d at 927. 
3 South Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 
180-91, 336 A.2d 713, 728-34 (1975). 
4 National Land & Investment Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 
504, 521-33, 215 A.2d 597, 606-12 (1965). 
5 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 653-54, 326 N.E.2d at 926-27. 
6 Williams & Norman, Exclusionary Land-Use Controls: The Case of North-East New Jersey, 
4 LAND-USE CoNTROLS Q. (Fall, 1970) at 4 [hereinafter cited as Williams & Norman]. 
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multi-family developments, the conditions imposed on the issuance of 
the permit may price the housing beyond the means of low and mod-
erate income families. Thus, even those sections of a community 
zoned for multiple family dwellings may be unavailable to those in the 
lower-income brackets. These zoning techniques result in reducing the 
supply of suburban low-cost housing, forcing the poor into over-
crowded, less desirable housing, and ultimately preventing residential 
integration along socio-economic lines. 7 
Minimum acreage requirements alone are not a major factor in 
preventing the development of low and moderate income housing. 8 
Residential building costs do not vary proportionately with the relative 
lot size. The construction costs of the house itself, together with the 
socio-economic status of the community, are most determinative of 
housing prices. 9 Nonetheless, the excessive mapping of large-lot zoning 
does have an impact on the housing patterns of the poor. By creating 
"holding zones," a community may channel urban development into 
other areas and thus escape spreading population growth. 10 
Judicial examination of the merits of an exclusionary zoning argu-
ment, on both the federal and state level, is often prevented by the 
doctrine of standing. On the federal level, review of exclusionary zon-
ing practices has been severely restricted by the Supreme Court's re-
cent decision in Warth v. Seldin. 11 The case involved claims that a 
town's zoning ordinances and practices made it impossible to construct 
enough low and moderate income housing to satisfy the needs of the 
town and the metropolitan area. 12 Challenges to the ordinances and 
practices came from three sources: (1) individual nonresidents who 
claimed, as low or moderate income persons, that they were excluded 
from the town by the zoning restrictions; (2) a group of taxpayers 
from a neighboring city who claimed that the town's practices resulted 
in a higher tax burden on city residents; and (3) an association of 
home builders who claimed that the town's restrictions had arbitrarily 
deprived them of profits. 13 While finding that none of the challengers 
had standing, the Court established the general principle that "a 
plaintiff who seeks to challenge exclusionary zoning practices must al-
7 See Sager, Tight Little Islands: 'Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 
STAN. L. REV. 767, 781-82 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Sager]. 
8 L. SAGALYN & G. STERNLIEB, ZONING AND HOUSING COSTS 6-16, 54, 66, 69 (1972) 
[hereinafter cited as Sagalyn & Sternlieb]; Williams, Doughty, & Potter, The Strategy on 
Exclusionary Zoning: Towards What Rationale and What Remedy?, 1972 LAND-USE CONTROLS 
ANNUAL 177, 185 [hereinafter cited as Williams, Doughty, & Potter]; Williams & Nor-
man, supra note 6, at 17-18. 
9 Sagalyn & Sternlieb, supra note 8, at 66, 69; Williams, Doughty, & Potter, supra note 
8, at 185. 
10 Williams & Norman, supra note 6, at 17. 
11 422 u.s. 490 (1975). 
12 /d. at 495-96. 
13 Id. at 496-97. 
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lege specific, concrete facts demonstrating that challenged practices 
harm him, and that he personally would benefit in a tangible way 
from the courts' intervention." 14 In a strongly worded dissent, three 
members of the Court disagreed with the majority's result and 
rationale. Stating that the decision contained "outmoded notions of 
pleading and justiciability,"15 the minority saw the decision as express-
ing "an indefensible hostility to the claim on the merits."16 
In several exclusionary zoning cases, state courts have been willing 
to liberalize standing requirements in order to examine the substan-
tive arguments. 17 A recent New Jersey case, for example, found that 
nonresidents living in substandard housing had standing to challenge 
a township's zoning ordinance on the ground that low and moderate 
income housing was excluded. 18 Building developers also have been 
allowed to challenge exclusionary zoning ordinances in some states. 19 
Interestingly, it has been the developers' challenges that have focused_ 
attention on minimum acreage requirements as a prominent exclu-
sionary technique. Because a builder's profit derives mainly from the 
house rather than from the land, he may increase his pmfit by divid-
ing the land into smaller lots and demanding a high price for each 
tract. Obviously, those people seeking inexpensive housing receive no 
benefit from these practices. However, since profit maximization will 
not support a challenge to a zoning ordinance,20 developers have as-
serted the interests of those excluded by large lot zoning, and courts 
have heard their arguments. 21 
14 !d. at 508 (emphasis in original). 
15 !d. at 521. 
16 /d. Warth was followed in Construction Indus. Assoc. v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 
897, 905 (9th Cir. I 975), where the plaintiffs, housing developers and local landowners, 
were denied standing to challenge a town's "growth control" measures on right to travel 
grounds but were granted standing to challenge the regulations on due process 
grounds. But see Ybarra v. City of Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974) 
(standing found where claim was that zoning ordinance violated due process, equal pro-
tection, and supremacy clauses). See generally Comment, Standing to Challenge Exclusionary 
Zoning in the Federal Courts, 17 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 347 (1976). 
17 Traditionally, the plaintiff was required to have a legally protected interest in order 
to challenge a zoning regulation. In Massachusetts, for example, a neighboring prop-
erty owner will have standing to challenge a zoning regulation under G.L. c. 40A, § 21, 
but will be denied such standing once he has moved. See Bradshaw v. Board of Appeals 
of Sudbury, 346 Mass. 558,560, 194 N.E.2d 716,717 (1963). 
18 South Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 159 
n.3, 336 A.2d 713, 717 n.3 (1975). 
19 See, e.g., Concord Township Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 ( 1970). 
20 See Circle Lounge & Grille, Inc. v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 324 Mass. 427, 
431-32, 86 N.E.2d 920, 923-24 (1949). 
21 See, e.g., case cited in note 19 supra. In Wilson, 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 
652-55, 326 N.E.2d at 926-27, the plaintiff-landowner claimed, without any objection 
that he lacked standing, that the minimum acreage requirements at issue were 
exclusionary. 
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Those plaintiffs that have successfully overcome the standing hur-
dle have usually claimed that exclusionary zoning techniques violate 
either the due process or equal protection clauses of the United States 
Constitution. 22 The due process approach is confined primarily to 
state courts because of the federal courts abandonment of substantive 
due processP The rationale behind the due process approach is that 
for government restrictions on property to be valid, they must further 
the general welfare. 24 When the burden of proof is placed on the 
challenger to show that a particular zoning technique does not further 
the general welfare, he will almost certainly lose. Minimum acreage 
requirements, for example, can almost always be supported by some 
topographical and soil considerations.25 In some states, however, the 
burden of proof has been shifted to the town. 26 The result has been 
the invalidation of exclusionary zoning techniques on due process 
grounds. In Concord Township Appeal, 27 for example, the Pennsylvania 
court held that two and three acre zoning was an unconstitutional re-
striction on the use of landowners' and developers' property. 28 The 
courts of both New Jersey and Pennsylvania have gone so far as to 
suggest that individual communities have an affirmative duty to pro-
vide adequate housing for all economic groups.29 
Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Village of 
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 30 the principle claim of those challenging ex-
clusionary zoning techniques had been that they violated the equal pro-
22 A third ground occasionally asserted as a basis for invalidating zoning techniques is 
the interstate right to travel. E.g., Construction Indus. Assoc. v. City of Petaluma, 522 
F.2d 897, 906 n.I3 (9th Cir. I975).:'see generally Note, 81 YALE L.J. 6I, 65 n.I6 (I97I) 
[hereinafter cited as Yale Note]. In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 4I6 U.S. I, 7 
(1974), noted in I974 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§ I6.I, at 346-48, however, the Supreme 
Court seems to have eliminated this as a possible rationale· by suggesting that the right 
to travel would be infringed only by ordinances "aimed at transients." 
23 See, e.g. Ybarra v. City of Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250, 254 (9th Cir. 
I97 4), where the court summarily rejected the plaintiffs due process claim as "without 
merit." See generally Yale Note, supra note 22, at 65-66. 
24 Yale Note, supra note 22, at 66. 
25 See, e.g., Steel Hill Development, Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956, 960 
( Ist Cir. I972). 
26 In South Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. I5I, 
I80-8I, 336 A.2d 7I3, 728 (I975), the court stated: 
[W]hen it has been shown that a developing municipality in its land use regulations 
has not made realistically possible ... the opportunity for low and moderate in-
come housing ... a facial showing of [a] violation of substantive due process ... 
has been made out and the burden, and it is a heavy one, shifts to the municipality 
to establish a valid basis for its actions or nonactions. 
27 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970). 
28 Id. at 474, 268 A.2d at 768. 
29 ld. at 476, 268 A.2d at 769; South Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of 
Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. I5I, 174, 336 A.2d 7I3, 724 (I975). 
30 4I6 U.S. I (I974). 
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tection clause.31 The argument was premised on the notion that the 
classes discriminated against, minorities and the poor, were "suspect" 
and that the interest affected, housing, was "fundamental." Conse-
quently, zoning restrictions should be measured by a compelling state 
interest test rather than a rationality standard.32 In Belle Terre, 
however, the Supreme Court, in upholding a zoning ordinance that 
restricted land use to one family dwellings occupied by no more than 
two unrelated people,33 stated that zoning is an area "where legisla-
tures have historically drawn lines which we respect against the charge 
of violation of Equal Protection Clause if the law be 'reasonable, not 
arbitrary' and 'bears a rational relationship to a [permissible] state 
objective.' "34 Thus, after Belle Terre, the burden placed on a chal-
lenger to an exclusionary zoning practice seems no less onerous under 
the equal protection clause than it is under the due process clause.35 
In Wilson v. Town of Sherborn, 36 the Massachusetts Appeals Court 
appears to have been faced with both a due process and an equal pro-
tection claim.37 The plaintiff owned 80 acres in Sherborn.38 A town 
by-law established a two acre minimum lot requirement for the area 
in which the plaintiffs property was located.39 The plaintiff claimed 
that the two acre minimum was invalid on two grounds: first, it was 
exclusionary; 40 and second, it caused a diminution in the value of his 
propertyY While the court di,d not specify the basis for the plaintiffs 
claims, the first appears to be an equal protection argument, and the 
second seems to be a due process argument. 
In rejecting the plaintiffs claim that the two acre minimum was 
exclusionary-the equal protection claim-the court seems to have 
combined the rational relationship standard of review suggested in 
Belle Terre, 42 with a slight shift in the burden of proof. 43 The court 
31 See Yale Note, supra note 22, at 67. 
32 See id.; Sager, supra note 7, at 785-98. 
33 416 U.S. at 2. 
34 Id. at 8, quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). 
35 In New Jersey, the state supreme court, although relying on the state rather than 
the federal constitution, has held that the same standards of review apply to both due 
process and equal protection claims. South Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township 
of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 181, 336 A.2d 713, 728 (1975). In New Jersey, however, this 
blurring of standards has not worked to the detriment of challengers because of that 
state's willingness to place the burden of justifying zoning restrictions on the munici-
pality. See text at notes 26-29 supra. 
36 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 643, 326 N.E.2d at 922. 
37 Id. at 655, 652, 326 N.E.2d at 927, 926. 
38 Id. at 643, 326 N.E.2d at 922. 
39 I d. at 643-44 & n.2, 326 N.E.2d at 922-23 & n.2. 
40 Id. at 652, 326 N.E.2d at 926. 
41 Id. at 655, 326 N.E.2d at 927. 
42 See text at notes 33-34 supra. 
43 See text at note 26 supra. 
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acknowledged the warning given in Simon v. Town of Needham 44 that "a 
zoning by-law cannot be adopted for the purpose of setting up a bar-
rier against the influx of thrifty and respectable citizens .... "45 
Therefore, the court required the town to bring forward some advan-
tages that were "tangible" and not "nebulous."46 Thus, while the bur-
den of persuasion was not entirely shifted to the town, Sherborn was 
required to present some showing of the by-law's necessity. All the 
court required, however, was a showing of a "reasonable basis" for the 
town's decision to impose a two acre minimum lot requirement. 47 The 
town met this burden by showing that it lacked municipal sewage and 
water facilities. Consequently, two acre lots were needed so that on-
site wells would not be contaminated by septic tanks. 48 The court went 
on to suggest that it need not require the town to meet a more strin-
gent burden because the equal protection r!ghts of low and moderate 
income groups are protected by the Anti-Snob Zoning Law,49 in which 
the Legislature required that the local interests of the town "yield to 
the regional need for the construction of low and moderate income 
housing."50 
The court rejected the plaintiffs second claim-the due process 
claim-by stating that: "Since we thus hold that the two-acre zoning in 
this case is within the police power, the plaintiffs argument that the 
by-law is invalid because his property is diminished in value ... must 
fail."51 Thus, the court, in the wake of Belle Terre, 52 seems to have 
adopted a similar standard of review for due process and equal pro-
tection claims.53 The court's reasoning seems to have been that since 
the two acre requirement had a reasonable basis, it was a valid exer-
cise of the town's police power, and therefore, it did not violate either 
due process or equal protection. 
Even though Wilson sustains the validity of a potentially exclu-
sionary zoning device, the Massachusetts decision may not be as con-
servative as it first appears. The regional approach to housing needs 
has been legislatively implemented in Massachusetts, while judicially 
44 311 Mass. 560,42 N.E.2d 516 (1942). 
45 Jd. at 565, 42 N.E.2d at 519. 
46 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 647, 326 N.E.2d at 924. See also 122 Main St. 
Corp. v. City of Brockton; 323 Mass. 646, 651, 84 N.E.2d 13, 16 (1949). 
47 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 647, 326 N.E.2d at 924. 
48 Id. at 647-52, 326 N.E.2d at 924-26. 
49 G.L. c. 40B, §§ 20-23. 
50 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 654, 326 N.E.2d at 926-27, citing Board of Ap-
peals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Comm. in the Dept. of Community Affairs, 363 
Mass. 339, 385, 294 N.E.2d 393, 424 (1973). For a discussion of the Anti-Snob Zoning 
Law see § 19.17 infra. 
51 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 655, 326 N.E.2d at 927. 
52 See text at note 35 supra. 
• 3 See note 35 supra. 
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adopted in New Jersey and Pennsylvania.54 Indeed, the Anti-Snob 
Zoning Law55 may be a more effective solution to exclusionary zoning 
practices. The Law allows developers to avoid exclusionary zoning de-
vices by obtaining comprehensive building permits from zoning 
boards of appeals, instead of obtaining all the local permits that would 
otherwise be necessary. In granting such comprehensive permits, the 
zoning boards of appeals have the authority to override any zoning 
requirement that is inconsistent with local needs.56 Thus, the Law as-
sures that those developers successfully challenging restrictive zoning 
provisions will implement their victories to benefit the poor, and not 
merely to build more high priced housing in a smaller area. However, 
the Anti-Snob Zoning Law does not require affirmative action, and in 
many cases, the technicalities of the Law may preclude many people 
from acquiring decent suburban housing. 
§19.2. Interim Zoning: Moratorium on Apartment Construction. 
While many courts are taking a critical look at exclusionary zoning 
practice's, 1 they are at the same time cognizant of the need for flexibil-
ity in contemporary zoning. 2 Temporary restrictions on permissible 
land uses pending revision of a comprehensive plan may have ex-
clusionary effects. However, they may be necessary in order to imple-
ment an effective plan for long-range community development. In 
Collura v. Town of Arlington, 3 the Supreme Judicial Court for the first 
time ruled on the validity of an interim zoning provision that placed a 
two year moratorium on the construction of apartment buildings in 
certain sections of the tOWI). 4 The Court held that the temporary 
freeze was permissible und-cf. section 2 ~ter 40A of the General 
Laws,5 and that it applied to the plaintiffs land.6 
In November, 1972, the plaintiff, a landowner in Arlington, applied 
for a building permit to construct a forty-unit, six-story apartment 
54 See text at note 29 supra. 
55 G.L. c. 40B, §§ 20-23. 
56 See generally Board of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Comm. in the Dept. 
of Community Affairs, 363 Mass. 339, 294 N .E.2d 393 ( 1973). 
§ 19.2. 1 See § 19.1 supra. 
2 See generally 1970 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 17.1; Freilich, Development Timing, 
Moratoria, and Controlled Growth, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING, 
& EMINENT DOMAIN (Sw. Legal Foundation 1974). 
3 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1753, 329 N.E.2d 733. 
4 /d. at 1753-54, 329 N .E.2d at 734. In Tra-fo Corp. v. Town Clerk of Methuen, 1974 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 1481, 317 N.E.2d 822, the Court dismissed as moot a challenge to a 
moratorium on the construction of residential building units in new subdivisions pend-
ing revision of the town's comprehensive plan because the moratorium had expired 
prior to the Court's ruling. 
5 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1760, 329 N.E.2d at 737. 
6 !d. at 1763-64, 329 N .E.2d at 738. 
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building on his land. The structure was permissible under the existing 
zoning provisions. On December 14 and 21, 1972, published notices 
announced a public hearing, which was held on December 28, 1972, 
to consider an article to be proposed at the March, 1973 town meet-
ing. The article would temporarily suspend construction of apartment 
buildings in certain areas of the town. 7 The plaintiff attended the 
hearing. On January 15, 1973, a permit was issued to him with a no-
tation that if the proposed "zoning amendment" were adopted, the 
permit would be affected under section II of chapter 40A of the 
General Laws, since no construction had been commenced under the 
permit. 8 
At the town meeting on March 19, 1973, the proposed article was 
adopted, declaring a two year moratorium on the issuance of building 
permits for construction of apartment buildings larger than two-
family dwellings in a designated "moratorium district" in order to 
"protect certain parts of the Town from ill-advised development 
pending final adoption of a revised Comprehensive Plan."9 
The plaintiff-landowner sought declaratory relief upholding the va-
lidity of his building permit. The trial court granted the relief re-
quested, holding that the article did not amend the town's zoning by-
law, and that, in any case, the article had prospective application 
only. 10 
On appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court, plaintiff first argued that 
the temporary ordinance was not an "amendment" to the Arlington 
zoning by-law. The Court, however, noted that the town had adhered 
to the proper procedure for amending a zoning by-law and that the 
article was referred to as an amendment in the altered by-law. 11 The 
Court held that the article had amended the zoning by-law even 
though it was designed to operate for a limited time. 12 Quoting the 
Connecticut Supreme Court, the Court stated, "[i]ndeed, all zoning 
regulations are in a sense "interim" because they can be amended at 
any time, after proper notice and subject to certain limitations."13 
The plaintiff further contended that the town lacked authority to 
enact an interim measure which suspended the operation of an exist-
ing by-law. In response to this contention, the Court first noted that 
the weight of authority does not require specific statutory authoriza-
7 !d. at I754, 329 N.E.2d at 734-35. 
8 Id., 329 N.E.2d at 735: G.L. c. 40A, § II provides that where a permit is issued after 
notice of hearing of a proposed change in the zoning by-laws, the permit does not jus-
tify violation of the subsequently adopted amendment. 
9 I975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at I755, 329 N.E.2d at 735, quoting Art. 57 of March I9, I973, 
Arlington Town Meeting. 
'"See id. at I753, I756, 329 N.E.2d at 734, 735. 
11 Id. at I757, 329 N.E.2d at 736. 
12 !d. at I756, 329 N.E.2d at 735. 
13 Id. at I757, 329 N.E.2d at 735, quoting Town of Lebanon v. Woods, I 53 Conn. I82, 
I87, 2I5 A.2d ll2, ll5 (1965). 
8
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tion for interim zoning ordinances. 14 The Court then discussed 
whether the objectives of interim provisions are consistent with the 
purposes of zoning. The Court found that interim ordinances may 
protect affected areas from unwise exploitation while the town reviews 
its zoning regulations and formulates new zoning restrictions insofar 
as "[i]nterim zoning can be considered a salutary device in the process 
of plotting a comprehensive zoning plan to be employed to prevent 
disruption of the ultimate plan itself."15 Procedurally, the Court em-
phasized that since the statutory amending procedure was followed, 
the landowner is no worse off than if the town had simply rezoned 
the area with the intent of later amending the by-law to reflect the 
new comprehensive plan. The town, by making explicit the temporary 
nature of the ordinance, promotes landowner participation in the de-
bate over what the new plan should contain. 16 The town's authority to 
enact interim zoning measures may be inferred, the Court held, from 
the broad delegation of authority granted to localities by the Zoning 
Enabling Act. 1 7 
The validity of Arlington's provision was upheld by ~he Court be-
cause it was adopted during the process of the town's revision of the 
Comprehensive Plan 18 and the restriction-a moratorium on apart-
ment construction-was both permissible 19 and geared to a matter of 
"genuine planning significance."20 Two years, the Court found, is not 
an unreasonable period during which to complete the planning 
14 See 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1760, 329 N .E.2d at 737 and cases cited therein. But see 
Lancaster Dev., Ltd. v. River Forest, 84 Ill. App. 2d 395, 399-400, 228 N.E.2d 526, 528 
(1967). 
15 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1761, 329 N.E.2d at 737. 
16 /d. at 1761-62, 329 N.E.2d at 737. 
17 See id. at 1758, 1760, 1762, 329 N.E.2d at 736, 737, citing G.L. c. 40A, §§ 2 & 3. 
The Court pointed to a second possible source of local zoning power, § 6 of The Home 
Rule Amendment, Art. II of the Amendments to the Constitution of the Common-
wealth. 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1759 n.3, 329 N.E.2d at 736-37 n.3. However, the Court 
expressly confined its ruling to the enabling act. /d. 
18 /d. at 1762-63, 329 N .E.2d at 738. 
19 /d. at 1762, 329 N.E.2d at 737, citing Moss v. Town of Winchester, 1974 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 755, 311 N.E.2d 555. 
20 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1762, 329 N.E.2d at 738. The New Jersey Supreme Court 
has also recognized that "stop-gap" zoning is "within the intent and purpose of the stat-
utes relating to planning .... " Monmouth Lumber Co. v. Ocean Township, 9 N.J. 64, 
75, 87 A.2d 9, 14 (1952). Moreover, it has indicated that an interim zoning ordinance, 
would be unconstitutional if it were not temporary, may be valid. Deal Gardens, Inc. v. 
Board of Trustees, 48 N.J. 492, 500, 226 A.2d 607, 611 (1967). Thus, in New Jersey, 
when the validity of an interim zoning ordinance is attacked, the court focuses prima-
rily upon the reasonableness of the time span rather than upon the reasonableness of 
the effect upon the plaintiffs land. See id. This approach appears to be in conflict with 
the analysis of the Supreme Judicial Court in Collura which apparently required both a 
reasonable time span and a restriction already permissible under Massachusetts law. See 
1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1762-63, 329 N.E.2d at 737-38. 
9
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process. 21 The Court concluded by holding that the amendment did 
not have prospective operation only, but applied to the plaintiff's 
building permit. 22 
The Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Collura v. Town of Arling-
ton is representative of the predominant judicial attitude toward flexi-
bility in zoning, particularly with. respect to recent growth control 
measures.23 For example, the New York courts have upheld an in-
terim zoning provision which placed a temporary freeze on the com-
mencement of construction during consideration of zoning changes 
proposed in a master plan. 24 Moreover, in Golden v. Town of Ramapo, 25 
the New York Court of Appeals sustained a town's zoning amend-
ment which phased subdivision development with the scheduled ex-
pansion of municipal facilities and services (e.g. sanitation, drainage, 
parks, roads, firehouses) as provided for in the town's 18-year capital 
plan. Under the zoning amendment, the landowner was prohibited 
from developing a proposed subdivision plan until the municipal 
facilities and services were made available, unless he were to l?rovide 
them himself.26 The court distinguished between a total prohibition of 
subdivision development and timed growth control measures. While 
the former may be invalidly exclusionary, the latter is a legitimate zon-
ing toolP 
The Connecticut Supreme Court has also sustained interim zoning 
ordinances despite the absence of specific statutory authorization. 28 
Moreover, in Zelvin v. Board of Appeals, 29 a lower court held a tempo~ 
rary repeal of a zoning regulation permitting the construction of gar-
21 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1763, 329 N.E.2d at 738. In New Jersey, inquiry into the 
reasonableness of the duration of an interim ordinance may include such factors as "the 
progress of the study being made, its nearness to completion, ... and the prospect for 
passage of a new (permanent) zoning ordinance ... ," and the good faith with which 
the town proceeds to expedite the new master plan. Campana v. Clark Township, 82 
N.J. Super. 392, 397, 197 A.2d 711, 714 (1964). The time span is unreasonable when 
the delay in completing and implementing the new master plan is caused solely by the 
town's inability to obtain federal funds for a planning and zoning survey. Deal Gardens, 
Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 48 N.J. 492, 500, 87 A.2d 607, 612 (1967). 
22 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1763-64, 329 N.E.2d at 738. See G.L. c. 40A, § 11. 
23 See generally Freilich, De~elopment Timing, Moratoria, and Controlled Growth, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING, & EMINENT DOMAIN 147 (Sw. Legal 
Foundation 1974); Deutch, Land-Use Growth Controls: A Case Study of San Jose & Liver-
more, Calif., 15 SANTA CLARA LAW 1 (1974); Comment, 18 SYRACUSE L. REV. 837 (1967). 
See also R. ANDERSON, 1 AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING§ 5.15, at 275 (1968); A. RATHKOPF, 1 
THELAWOFZONINGANDPLANNINGc.,8A (3d ed. 1974). 
•24 Ru,bin v. McAievey, 54 Misc. 2d 338, 340-41, 282 N.Y.S.2d 564, 567-68 (Sup. Ct. 
1967), ajfd., 29 App. Div. 2d 874, 288 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1968). 
25 30 N.Y.2d 359, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 285 N.E.2d 291, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 
(1972). 
26 Id. at 368, 371, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 143-44, 146, 285 N.E.2d at 295-96, 297. 
27 !d. at 376, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 150, 285 N.E.2d at 300. 
28 Town of Lebanon v. Woods, 153 Conn. 182, 186-88, 215 A.2d 112, 115 (1965). 
29 30 Conn. Supp. 157, 306 A.2d 151 (C.P. 1973). 
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den apartments constitutional. 30 The fourteen month old ordinance 
was repealed so that the town could both assess the impact of the con-
struction of the apartments, for which approval had already been 
granted, and develop a new comprehensive planY The court found 
the temporary repeal to be a reasonable response to a community 
planning problem. 32 
Delaware's approach to interim zoning distinguishes between land 
which is in a highly developed area with established patterns of con-
struction and development, and land which is newly annexed or 
underdeveloped. While no stop-gap zoning is apparently allowed in 
the former situation, it is permitted in the latter. 33 
Interim zoning ordinances designed to control growth have been 
challenged as exclusionary in several cases before federal courts. In 
Steel Hill Development, Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 34 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the validity of three and 
six acre minimum zoning ordinances.35 Although the New Hamp-
shire town in Steel Hill had apparently not adopted the ordinances on 
a temporary basis,36 the court allowed the six-acre m~nimum ordi-
nance to stand as a legitimate stop-gap measure which would allow 
the town time "to plan with more precision for the future." 37 The 
court emphasized that the developer in this case was not merely at-
tempting to satisfy a demand for first-home expansion into towns in 
the path of population growth, but rather, was attempting to create a 
demand by urbanites for a second home in rural Sanbornton. 38 Thus, 
the court decided, the town should be allowed the time to strike "the 
right balance between ecological and population pressures."39 In 
Construction Industry Association v. Petaluma, 40 the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected a challenge to the city's 
five-year plan, which plan limited the construction of residential units 
to a rate below that of the city's natural population growth.41 The 
court held that the exclusion bore a rational relationship to Petaluma's 
legitimate interests in preserving "its small town character, its open 
spaces and low density of population ... " at its deliberately paced 
growth.42 More successful was the challenge in Kennedy Park Homes As-
30 I d. at 162, 306 A.2d at 157. 
31 Id., 306 A.2d at 156-57. 
32 I d., 306 A.2d at 157. 
33 Willdel Realty, Inc. v. New Castle County, 270 A.2d 174, 176-77 (Del. Ch. 1970). 
34 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972). 
35 I d. at 960, 962. 
36 See id. at 959, 962. 
37 I d. at 962. 
38 Id. at 961. 
39 I d. at 962. 
40 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975). 
41 I d. at 902, 909. 
4
' I d. at 906, 908-09. 
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sociation v. Lackawanna43 to a moratorium on the approval of subdivi-
sion plans allegedly because of sewage problems. The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that the measure had 
the effect, if not the purpose, of preventing the development by black 
families of a tract of land located in a white section of the city.44 Since 
the city had lonS neglected its sewer system, its interest was held to be 
not compelling. 
§19.3. Spot Zoning:• General Welfare as Justification. In 
Raymond v. Building Inspector of Brimfield, 2 the Appeals Court upheld a 
zoning amendment which permitted the town's only industry and 
largest employer to expand. 3 The locus was a 4. 7 acre parcel of land 
that was situated in a sparsely settled area and close to several main 
roads. The company operated in a one-story masonry structure with a 
floor area of 3000 square feet. Under the original zoning by-law, 
adopted in 1968, these operations constituted a nonconforming use in 
an agricultural-residential district. 4 The company caused no environ-
mental problems, nor did it demand more than minimal municipal 
services. 5 In 1971, the company was refused a permit to expand its 
building. The company's owner then requested that the area be re-
zoned from agricultural-residential to industrial. After the planning 
board unanimously rejected the proposed amendment, the owner told 
the board of selectmen that if the company were allowed to expand, it 
would enlarge its work force, but if the proposed amendment were 
not approved, the company would move out of the community. The 
town meeting voted to accept the zoning change.6 
The court held that the amendment was not a form of spot zoning 
because the public welfare of the town was furthered by preserving 
the company's presence in the town. 7 Moreover, the particular locus 
was an obviously appropriate area for an industrial zone. 8 
The Raymond decision is another example of the court's willingness 
to sustain such ordinances by broadly construing the "promotion of 
the public welfare" objective of the Zoning Enabling Act. 9 Although 
43 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. rknied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971). 
44 !d. at 109-10. 
45 /d. at 114. 
§ 19.3. 1 The term "spot zoning" describes "an ·amendment which reclassifies a small 
parcel in a manner inconsistent with existing zoning patterns, for the benefit of the 
owner and to the detriment of the community, or without any substantial public pur-
pose." R. ANDERSON. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING§ 5.04, at 242 (1968). 
2 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 179, 322 N.E.2d 197. 
3 !d. at 186, 332 N.E.2d at 200. 
4 !d. at 182, 332 N.E.2d at 198. 
• !d. at 180, 332 N .E.2d at 198. 
6 !d. at 182, 332 N.E.2d at 198. 
7 Id. at 183-84, 332 N.E.2d at 198-99. 
8 !d. at 185, 332 N.E.2d at 199. 
9 G.L. c. 40A, § 2. See Lanner v. Board of Appeals of Tewksbury, 348 Mass. 220, 
228-29, 202 N.E.2d 777, 783-84 (1964), noted in 1965 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§ 14.1, at 
185. See also 1966 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§ 15.4, at 194. 
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the facts suggest that the company exerted pressure on the town for 
the company's own benefit, the town's interest in retaining its only in-
dustry was deemed overriding and the spot zoning challenge failed. 
§19.4. Zoning Amendment: Applicability to Building Permit 
Under Appeal. In Smith v. Building Commissioner of Brookline (Smith 
II), 1 the Supreme Judicial Court was asked to determine the effect on 
a building permit of zoning amendments enacted while the issuance 
of the permit was being appealed. In an earlier case (Smith I), 2 the 
town enacted amendments to the zoning by-laws after the building 
permit had been issued.3 The plaintiff, who was challenging the grant-
ing of the permit, appealed to the superior court seeking to annul the 
decision of Brookline's board of appeals which had denied his appeal 
from the building commissioner's granting of the permit.4 The 
superior court annulled the board of appeals' decision because con-
struction had not been commenced within six months after issuance 
of the permit as required by section 11 of chapter 40A of the General 
Laws.5 The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed,6 and the case was re-
manded to the board of appeals. 7 Meanwhile, Brookline had amended 
its by-laws, so that if the now completed building was subject to them, 
it would have to be destroyed and rebuilt. 8 On remand, the board of 
appeals found that the building could shortly be brought into com-
pliance with the requirements imposed in Smith I, and returned the 
case to the building commissioner for modification of the permit.9 
The owner and the builder sought a declaration that the building 
would not be subject to the later amendments. 10 
The Supreme Judicial Court recognized that, because the initial 
permit had been found defective in Smith I, the case did not clearly 
fall within the statutory exemption of section 11, which protects build-
ings lawfully under construction from new zoning requirements. 11 
The Court, reasonin_g that the effect of Smith I was to annul the 
board's decision denying the petition to revoke the permit, rather 
than to annul the permit itself, rejected the contention that the permit 
was rendered void ab initio by the decision in Smith I. 12 The Court 
then held that the board of appeals had the power to modify the 
permit, and, since it did so, the permit had retroactive effect for pur-
poses of protection from zoning amendments. 13 
§19.4. 1 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1574, 328 N.E.2d 866. 
2 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1387, 316 N.E.2d 501 (1974). 
3 Id. at 1388, 316 N.E.2d at 502. 
4 Id. at 1387, 316 N.E.2d at 502. 
~See id. at 1389-90, 316 N.E.2d at 502-03. 
8 Id. at 1390-91, 316 N.E.2d at 503-04. 
7 See 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1583, 328 N.E.2d at 870. 
8 See id. at 1579 n.5, 328 N.E.2d at 869 n.5. 
9 See id. at 1580 n.6, 1584-85, 328 N.E.2d at 869 n.6, 871. 
10 Id. at 1577-78, 328 N.E.2d at 868. 
"Id. at 1581-82, 328 N.E.2d at 870. 
12 Id. at 1582-83, 328 N.E.2d at 870. 
13 ld. at 1584-85, 328 N.E.2d at 871. 
13
Huber: Chapter 19: Zoning and Land Use
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1975
526 1975 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSElTS lAW §19.5 
The Court's decision in Smith II was significant for its interpretation 
of the appellate powers of the local boards of appeals. Section 15 of 
the Enabling Act empowers the boards to "hear and decide appeals"14 
by persons aggrieved by the decisions of local zoning officials. 15 
Under section 19 of the Act, the board may "reverse or affirm in 
whole or in part, or may modify, any order or decision, and may 
make such order or decision as ought to be made, and to that end 
shall have all the powers of the officer from whom the appeal is taken 
•••• " 16 The Court in Smith II held that boards may exercise these 
powers "not only where the appeal is going up the scale, ... but also 
when the process is reversed and questions as to compliance with zon-
ing requirements are necessarily before the board again on remand 
"17 
As the Court noted, its decision permitting boards of appeals to 
modify permits on remand and thereby protect them from subse-
quent by-law amendments promotes the legislative intent of the "Sav-
ing Clause,"18 promotes remedial action to avoid destruction of build-
ings with remediable defects, and protects appellate right by ensuring 
that persons will not be prejudiced by the time required to adjudicate 
zoning controversies. 19 
§19.5. Special Permits: Standing to Challenge: Person Aggrieved; 
Waiver of Notice Requirement. During the 1975 Survey year the 
Appeals Court ruled on two cases challenging the issuance of special 
permits. In both cases, the court denied relief and restricted the scope 
of appeals permitted under section 21 of chapter 40A of the General 
Laws. 
In Waltham Motor Inn v. La Cava, 1 the plaintiffs challenged two 
separate decisions of the city council of Waltham granting special 
permits for the construction of a hotel and hoteVmotel, respectively, 
in a limited commercial zoning district. The defendants contended 
that none of the plaintiffs was a "person aggrieved" within the mean-
ing of section 21. The superior court agreed and dismissed the bills in 
equity. 2 
One plaintiff was an incorporated motor inn operating under a 
long-term lease on land abutting both parcels for which the special 
permits were issued.3 The corporation did not receive written notice 
•• G.L. c. 40A, § 15. 
IS Id. § 13. 
16 Id. § 19. 
17 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1584, 328 N.E.2d at 871. 
18 G.L. c. 40A, § II. 
19 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1586-87, 328 N.E.2d at 871-72. 
§19.5. 1 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 584, 326 N.E.2d 348. 
• !d. at 585, 326 N.E..2d at 349. 
3 The court assumed, without deciding, that a lease for ninety-nine years constituted 
the lessee an "owner" for purposes of G.L. c. 40A, § 17. 1975 Ma~. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 
14
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1975 [1975], Art. 23
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1975/iss1/23
§19.5 ZONING AND LAND USE 527 
of the public hearings held in either case, but its counsel appeared at 
both hearings and opposed both applications. Owners of a second 
motel abutting one of the contested parcels were coplaintiffs in the 
first case. They received written notice of the public hearing and ap-
peared in opposition to the special permit. Both motels were located 
within a limited commercial zoning district, where hotels, motels, and 
hoteVmotels were allowed only under special permit.4 Additional 
plaintiffs in each case were individual owners of land situated in resi-
dential zoning districts at least one mile from the parcels in question. 5 
The Appeals Court first noted that the plaintiff motel owners were 
entitled to an initial presumption that they were "persons aggrieved" 
within the meaning of the statute. 6 Both motel owners enjoyed the 
presumption as "nearby owner(s) of property lying in the same or in a 
substantially similar type of zoning district .... "7 The second motel 
owner was also entitled to the presumption because it had received 
the statutorily mandated8 notice from the council as a "person af-
fected"· by the special permit. 9 The court then ruled on the effect to 
be given the presumption, and concluded that if the issue is contested 
by the presentation of evidence, the presumption disappears and the 
issue is to be decided based on the evidence presented. 10 Since the 
only interest of the plaintiffs apparent in the record was the protec-
tion of their businesses from the anticipated competition-an interest 
not legally protected-the court found the motel owners not to be 
"persons aggrieved" by the issuance of the permit. 11 The court also 
indicated that since both motels were themselves operating under a 
special permit, the owners could not have "any legitimate interest in 
preserving the integrity of the district from further like uses." 12 The 
other plaintiffs offered no evidence of their interest in contesting the 
permit. Because their land was situated in a residential zoning district 
more than a mile from· the parcels in question, the court found they 
were not entitled to a presumption of being a person aggrieved, and 
at 588 n.9, 326 N.E.2d at 351 n.9. In Kasper v. Board of Appeals of Watertown, 1975 
Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 675. 326 N.E.2d 915, the plaintiffs son, a tenant in one of the 
affected buildings owned by his father, was also named as a plaintiff in the bill. The 
court dismissed the bill as to him on the ground he was not a "person aggrieved." !d. at 
676 n.3, 326 N.E.2d at 916 n.3. 
4 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at .588-89, 326 N.E.2d at 350-51. 
5 /d. at 590, 326 N.E.2d at 351. 
6 /d. at 591-92, 326 N.E.2d at 352. 
7 !d. at 592, 326 N.E.2d at 352. 
8 See G.L. c. 40A, § 17. 
9 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 592, 326 N.E.2d at 352. 
10 !d. at 593, 326 N.E.2d at 352, citing Marotta v. Board of Appeals of Revere, 336 
Mass. 199, 204, 143 N.E.2d 270, 274 (1957), noted in 1957 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW 
§§ 11.2, at 68, 33.3 at 235-36. 
11 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 595, 326 N.E.2d at 353. See Circle Lounge & 
Grille, Inc. v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 324 Mass. 427, 429-30, 86 N.E.2d 920, 922 
(1949), noted in 1967 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§ 11.5, at 202. 
12 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 595, 326 N.E.2d at 353. 
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dismissed their claim. 13 A "general civic interest in the enforcement of 
the zoning ordinance," the court held, is not a sufficient interest 
under the statute to permit an appeal. 14 
Although one abutting landowner in La Cava did not receive writ-
ten notice of the public hearing, required by section 17 of section 40A 
of the General Laws, that issue was neither argued nor considered in 
that case. 15 The jurisdictional consequence of a board's failure to give 
such notice was settled in the subsequent decision in Kasper v. Board of 
Appeals of Watertount. 16 
In Kasper, the Watertown board had granted a special permit for 
the operation of an auto body repair business. The plaintiff owned 
three contiguous multi-family dwellings which fronted on the same 
side of the street as the locus. Both the locus and the dwellings were 
in the same industrial zoning district. 17 Following appropriate news-
paper notices, a public hearing was held on the petition for the special 
permit. Notice had not been sent to the plaintiff, but he and his son 
learned of the hearing twelve days in advance thereof, on the date of 
the second newspaper publication. Both attended the hearing in op-
position to the special permit. The plaintiffs son, an attorney, ob-
jected to the hearing because of failure of notice; he also presented 
evidence on the merits and argued against the permit. 18 The superior 
court confirmed the decision of the board to grant the special permit. 
The Appeals Court first rejected appellant's contention that the 
board's failure to give him written notice of the hearing deprived the 
board of jurisdiction to act on the permit application. 20 The court 
compared the Kasper situation with that presented in Co-Ray Realty 
Co. v. Board of Zoning Adjustment of Boston. 21 In Co-Ray, the board after 
attempting to locate the plaintiffs correct address, mailed notice of 
the hearing to the affected vacant lot. 22 The Supreme Judicial Court 
found the efforts to locate the correct address to be reasonable, and, 
therefore, refused to annul the board's decision.23 The court in Kasper 
noted that the notice given in Co-Ray was equivalent to no notice at 
all, and read that case as standing "for the proposition that not every 
decision of an administrative board need be invalidated for the 
board's failure to comply precisely with each of the notice provisions 
13 /d. at 596, 326 N .E.2d at 353. 
14 /d. at 596-97, 326 N.E.2d at 353. 
1" !d. at 588 & n.9, 326 N.E.2d at 351 & n.9. 
18 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 675, 326 N.E.2d 915. 
17 Id. at 675-76, 326 N.E.2d at 916. 
18 /d. at 677,326 N.E.2d at 917. 
19 Id. at 675, 326 N.E.2d at 916. 
20 /d. at 683, 326 N.E.2d at 918. 
21 328 Mass. 103, 101 N.E.2d 888 (1951). 
22 /d. at 107, 101 N.E.2d at890-91. 
23 /d. at 108, 101 N.E.2d at 891. 
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"
24 As the court noted, this interpretation avoids the possibility 
that successful petitions could remain subject indefinitely to attack 
through mandamus proceedings because of a technical failure in 
board procedure.25 The court then held that, because the plaintiff 
had actual notice of the hearing and had the opportunity to present 
his case to the board, he was not prejudiced by the nonreceipt of the 
prescribed notice.26 Moreover, by participating in the hearing without 
requesting a postponement, the plaintiff waived his objection to the 
failure of notice. 27 
Both the Kasper and La Cava cases indicate the court's reluctance to 
overturn decisions made by local appeals boards on narrow, noncriti-
cal procedural grounds. In both cases, a strict interpretation of the 
statutes could have led to contrary results. In La Cava, the plaintiff 
motel owners arguably met the statutory requirements as "persons ag-
grieved" py the issuance of the special permit. However, their posi-
tions as competitive enterprises in the same zoning district disqualified 
them from challenging the permit. In Kasper, the prescribed notice 
provisions of section 17 of chapter 40A of the General Laws, were not 
completely satisfied, yet the court found that the plaintiffs had suf-
ficient notice. Thus, m each case, the court weighed the statutory re-
quirement against the particular facts and concluded that neither 
permit should be reconsidered. 
§ 19.6. Special Permit: Power in the Superior Court to Remand a 
Case to the Local Board; Power to Modify Defective Permit. The 
Supreme Judicial Court and the Appeals Court occasionally remand 
to local boards of appeals cases involving a grant or denial of a special 
permit or variance.' During the 1975 Survey year, the Appeals Court, 
in Roberts-Haverhill Associates v. City Council of Haverhill, 2 ruled that 
the superior court has the power to remand a variance case to a board 
of appeals "whenever circumstances are such that an appellate court 
could order such action to be taken."3 
24 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 682, 326 N.E.2d at 918. 
25 Jd. at 682-83, 326 N.E.2d at 918-19. 
26 Id. at 684-85, 326 N.E.2d at 919. 
27 Id. at 685-86, 3l!6 N.E.2d at 919. 
§19.6. 1 E.g., MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 347 Mass. 690, 692, 200 
N.E.2d 254, 256 (1964); GEM Properties, Inc. v. Board of Appeals of Milton, 341 Mass. 
99, 106, 167 N.E.2d 315, 320 (1960). 
2 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 2159, 319 N.E.2d 916. 
3 Id. at 2164, 319 N.E.2d at 919. The court found the power to remand in G.L. c. 
40A, § 21, which provides in pan: 
The [superior] court shall hear all evidence peninent to the authority of the board 
and determine the facts, and, upon the facts so determined, annul such decision if 
found to exceed the authority of such board, or make such other decree as justice 
and equity may require. 
Since the§ 21 provisions with regard to review by the district court are somewhat dif-
ferent, the extent of the district court's power to remand may differ from that of the 
superior court. See Roberts-Haverhill, 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2165 n.10, 319 
N.E.2d at 919 n.10. 
17
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In Roberts-Haverhill, the city council, acting pursuant to its powers to 
consider requests for permits, had denied the plaintiffs application 
for a special permit to construct garden apartments in a residential 
high-density zoning district. 4 The council had enumerated eight 
reasons for its deniai.S The case had been referred to a master6 who 
found that as many as five of the reasons had no substantial basis in 
fact. 7 The superior court judge ordered that the master's report be 
confirmed, noting that there were two possible valid reasons support-
ing the council's decision. 8 Since these were not the only reasons given 
by the council, and the council's findings left it unclear whether the 
permit would have been denied if these had been the only reasons 
under consideration, the superior court: (1) annulled the decision of 
the council, and (2) ordered the council to make a new determination 
with respect to the application in light of the opinion. 9 The plaintiffs 
appealed the "so called 'Final Decree' " entered pursuant to that 
order. 10 
The Appeals Court approved the remand, reasoning that merely 
annulling a decision in such a case "often serve(s) not to terminate the 
underlying controversy but to prolong it in the form of further appli-
cations, hearings, decisions, and possible appeals."11 In many cases 
this duplication could be avoided by allowing the board to make 
further fact findings, by permitting it to elaborate the reasons for its 
decision, or by directing the board to reconsider an application in 
light of different legal principles. 12 The court concluded that exercise 
of the power to remand "will be in the best interest of litigants and 
the courts." 13 
Although it was a case of first impression, the decision in Roberts-Haverhill appears 
merely to validate an existing practice of the superior court. See id. at 2165, 3I9 N.E.2d 
at 9I9. Indeed, the Appeals Court, prior to its decision in Roberts-Haverhill, affirmed a 
superior court remand of a variance case to the local board without reaching the issue 
of the superior court's power to do so. See Waldron v. Board of Appeal of Malden, 
1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 843, 3I6 N.E.2d 5IO. 
4 See I974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2I59-60, 3I9 N.E.2d at 9I7. 
5 See id. at 2I59-60 n.2, 3I9 N.E.2d at 9I7 n.2. The reasons were: (I) saturation of 
the area with garden apartments; (2) overcrowding of the district's schools; (3) water 
and sewage problems; (4) increased traffic problems; (5) excessive costs for additional 
municipal services; (6) not in the best interests of the city; (7) excessive amount of sub-
sidized housing in the city; and (8) excessive number of apartment permits pending. /d. 
6 See id. at 2I60, 319 N .E.2d at 9I7. The court noted that the practice of submitting 
such cases to a master has been strongly disapproved. /d. n.3. See Garelick v. Board of 
Appeals of Franklin, 350 Mass. 289, 290, 2I4 N.E.2d 60, 6I (I966). 
7 See I974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2I60 n.4, 3I9 N.E.2d at 9I7 n.4. See also 
reasons I, 3, 5, 7, and perhaps 8 set forth in note 5 supra. 
8 See I974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2I6I, 3I9 N.E.2d at 9I8. 
9 /d. at 2I6I-62, 3I9 N.E.2d at 9I8. 
10 /d. at 2I62, 3I9 N.E.2d at 9I8. 
11 !d. 
12 !d. 
13 !d. at 2I65, 3I9 N.E.2d at 9I9. 
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After determining that the superior court had the authority to re-
mand the case to the city council, the Appeals Court dismissed the 
appeal on the ground that it had been taken from an interlocutory 
decree. 14 The court held that the superior court's remand of a var-
iance case to the board of appeals is not a final order, and that an ap-
peal may not be had until the board has reconsidered the application 
and an appeal, if any, from that decision has been taken to the 
superior court. 15 
The Appeals Court's subsequent decision in Chira v. Planning Board 
of Tisbury 16 further extended the scope of the superior court's author-
ity to efficiently manage the resolution of variance cases. In Chira, the 
superior court ruled that the board of appeals had exceeded its 
authority by granting special permits which allowed attached, as well 
as detached, buildings on the locus. The court therefore entered de-
crees modifying the permits to exclude attached buildings. On appeal, 
appellant abutters claimed that by modifying the permits the superior 
court had usurped the statutory power of the board of appeals to 
issue special permits. They argued that the court was required by law 
to annul the decisions and remand the cases to the board for further 
proceedings. 17 The Appeals Court held that the language "to make 
such other decree as justice and equity may require," of section 21 of 
chapter 40A of the General Laws provides the superior court with the 
power to modify special permits in some cases. 18 The court appeared 
to limit the exercise of this power to cases in which "it is clear from 
the record that exactly the same ultimate result would occur from a 
remand as that effected by the decree .... "19 The Appeals Court's 
liberal construction of the superior court's power under section 21 is 
practical in terms of both judicial efficiency and fairness to the permit 
applicant. 
§19.7. Special Permits: Failure to Comply with Notice 
Provisions. Under section 21 of chapter 40A of the General Laws, 
an appeal to the superior court from a board of appeals decision on a 
special permit application must be taken within twenty days after the 
board has filed its decision. The statute further requires that 
"[ w ]ritten notice of such appeal together with a copy of the bill in 
equity shall be given to such city or town clerk within said twenty day 
appeal period."1 
14 /d. at 2168,319 N.E.2d at 920. 
Is !d. 
16 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1034, 333 N.E.2d 204. 
17 See id. at 1043, 333 N.E.2d at 209. The board of appeals questioned the judge's 
underlying ruling, but supported his action in modifying its decision without remand. 
See id. at 1044 n.8, 333 N.E.2d at 209 n.8. 
18 !d. at 1044, 333 N.E.2d at 209. 
19 !d. at 1043-44, 333 N.E.2d at 209. 
§19.7. I G.L. c. 40A, § 21. 
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Although the requirements are jurisdictionai,2 the Supreme Judicial 
Court does not require strict compliance with the specifications of sec-
tion 21. For example, the petitioner in McLaughlin v. Rockland Zoning 
Board of Appeals3 filed with the town clerk a copy of the bill in equity, 
but not the written notice, within the prescribed time limit; 4 while the 
petitioner in Carr v. Board of Appeals of Saugus 5 filed written notice, 
but not a copy of the bill, within the twenty-day period. 6 In both 
cases, however, the court permitted the appeal to proceed despite the 
procedural defects. 7 The Court concluded that the purpose of the sec-
tion 21 time requirement "is to give interested third parties at least 
constructive notice of the appeal,"8 and that this purpose is fulfilled 
by the timely filing of either the bill in equity or the notice of appeal. 9 
The effect of noncompliance with the twenty-day time limit for fil-
ing was again placed in issue during the 197 5 Survey year. In Costello 
v. Board of Appeals of Lexington, 10 the petitioner mailed written notice 
of the appeal and a copy of the bill in equity to the town clerk on the 
twentieth day after the board's decision. The notice did not reach the 
clerk until the following day-the twenty-first day after the board's 
decision was filed.U The board's plea in abatement was sustained by 
the superior court on the ground that notice had not been received by 
the twentieth day. 12 
In affirming the decision of the superior court, the Appeals Court 
held that since the petitioner had not satisfied the notice requirements 
of section 21, his appeal to the superior court could not be 
maintained. 13 The court noted that under McLaughlin and Carr 
compliance with all the details of the provision is not required. How-
ever, notice adequate to give interested third parties at least construc-
tive notice of the appeal within the twenty-day period is necessary for 
the fulfillment of the purpose of section 21. 14 The court dismissed the 
petitioner's contention that the mailing of notice within the time limit 
satisfied the statutory requirement, stating that, "[i]n the abse~t'YP" 
express provision to the contrary, a notice is not given until received 
2 Halko v. Board of Appeals of Billerica, 349 Mass. 465, 467, 209 N.E.2d 323, 325 
(1965). 
3 351 Mass. 678, 223 N.E.2d 521 (1967). 
4 /d. at 679-80, 223 N.E.2d at 522. 
5 361 Mass. 361, 280 N.E.2d 199 (1972). Both the Carr and the McLaughlin cases are 
surveyed in 1972 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§ 22.8, at 629-30. 
6 361 Mass. at 361, 280 N.E.2d at 199. 
7 McLaughlin, 351 Mass. at 680, 223 N.E.2d at 523; Carr, 361 Mass. at 363, 280 
N .E.2d at 200. 
8 361 Mass. at 362, 280 N.E.2d at 200. 
9 Id. at 362-63, 280 N.E.2d at 200. 
10 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1046, 333 N.E.2d 210. 
11 /d. at 1046,333 N.E.2d at211. 
12 /d. at 1046-47,333 N.E.2d at 211. 
13 /d. at 1047-48, 333 N.E.2d at 211-12. 
14 /d. at 1048, 333 N.E.2d at 212. 
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by the person to be notified."15 Thus, the court in Costello required 
that either the notice of appeal or a copy of the bill in equity be re-
ceived by the town clerk within the twenty-day period. 
In a companion case, filed after the superior court sustained the 
plea in abatement, the plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus ordering 
the building inspector to enforce the zoning by-law by prohibiting the 
specially permitted use of the premises. The Appeals Court affirmed 
the sustaining of the inspector's answer in abatement. 16 The court ap-
plied Saab v. Building Inspector of Lowell, 17 which refused to permit a 
"second chance" at appeal through a mandamus action when a 
petitioner failed to properly utilize other available remedies. 18 The 
court's summary treatment of the issue in Costello indicates that any at-
tempt to retrieve by mandamus action an otherwise forfeited appeal 
will be unsuccessful. 
The Costello case illustrates the point beyond which the court will 
not go in overlooking instances of noncompliance with procedural 
time restrictions. The reasonable flexibility allowed in McLaughlin and 
Carr will not be carried to the point at which the twenty-day limit be-
comes meaningless. Under the circumstances of the Costello case, any 
other result would have been difficult to justify. 
§ 19.8. Zoning: Access Roads. The use of residentially zoned 
land for access to property in a nonresidential district was contested in 
two cases during the 1975 Survey year. In Building Inspector of Dennis v. 
Harney, 1 the Appeals Court emphasized the need for specific zoning 
authorization for such roadways. The property in question was a 
corner lot located primarily in an "unrestricted" zoning district. 2 One 
side of the lot was zoned residential to a depth of 150 feet. The de-
fendants operated a business on the unrestricted portion of the prop-
erty. At issue was a roadway constructed by the defendants that ran 
through both the residential and unrestricted portions of the land, 
from one bordering street to another. This roadway was used as an 
15 /d. The court rejected the plaintiffs argument that a 1969 amendment to § 21 
eliminated the necessity of receipt of notice within twenty days. Prior to the amend-
ment, the provision read: "Notice ... shall be given to such city or town clerk so as to 
be received within such twenty days." Acts of 1960, c. 365. The amendment deleted the 
phrase, "so as to be received within such twenty days." Acts of 1969, c. 706. The Ap-
peals Court held that the deletion merely eliminated a redundancy; the change was not 
the purpose of the amendment and the legislative history did not indicate an intent to 
make sending of notice sufficient. 1975 ~ass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1050-51, 333 N.E.2d 
at 212-13. 
18 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1051, 333 N.E.2d at 213. 
17 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 95, 294 N.E.2d 458. 
18 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1051, 333 N.E.2d at 213. 
§ 19.8. 1 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 923, 317 N .E.2d 81. 
2 In an "unrestricted" district, the zoning by-law permitted "any use ... residential 
... business, or industrial, which is legal, proper, and not otherwise regulated or for-
bidden." Id. at 923 n.2, 317 N.E.2d at 82 n.2. 
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additional means of access to the defendants' place of business. 3 
The superior court found that such use of the residentially zoned 
portion of the defendants' land was illegal under the town's zoning 
by-law, and ordered the roadway barricaded.4 On appeal, the defend-
ants sought to justify the roadway, because it was used by the public 
to gain access to other residential and commercial property in the 
town. The Appeals Court, however, held that this was not a qualifying 
use under the by-law, because it was neither residential in nature nor 
an accessory to a permitted use on the same lot.5 The court modified 
the decree to permit the barricade to be removable, so that the 
petitioners and the residents of an adjoining dwelling could use the 
roadway. Use of the roadway as access to the business was perma-
nently enjoined.6 
As the Harney case indicates, courts will not permit nonconforming 
access roads through residential districts without the express approval 
of the local zoning authorities. The scope of this position has been 
demonstrated by a series of cases, the latest occurring during the 197 5 
Survey year, challenging a similar access road in Braintree. 
In Harrison v. Building Inspector of Braintree (Harrison /), 7 the town 
had enacted a zoning amendment which created an industrial district 
entirely surrounded by a 200 foot wide residentially zoned strip. The 
defendant corporation operated a factory in the industrial district. In 
order to provide access to its plant, the corporation purchased resi-
dentially zoned land on either side of the plaintiffs land and con-
structed access roadways. Demurrers to the plantiffs petition for a 
writ of mandamus were sustained by the superior court. 8 On appeal 
to the Supreme Judicial Court, defendants, the corporation and the 
town's building inspector, contended that means of access over the resi-
dential strip were necessarily implicit in the creation of an industrial 
zone completely surrounded by a residential zone.9 The Court recog-
nized that the amendment may have effected an unreasonable classifi-
cation with regard to the industrial district. It held, however, that 
"[t]here is no basis in the statute or in the nature of zoning for adding 
uses by implication to one zone to make reasonable the classification 
of another zone."10 The Court ordered that, on remand, any issuance 
of a writ of mandamus should be delayed so that the town could act 
to provide legal access to the industrial district. 11 
3 !d. at 924, 317 N .E.2d at 82. 
4 !d. 
5 /d. at 924-25, 317 N.E.2d at 82-83. 
6 !d. at 925-26, 317 N.E.2d at 83. 
7 350 Mass. 559, 215 N.E.2d 773 (1966), noted in 1966 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§ 15.3, 
at 193. 
8 350 Mass. at 561, 215 N.E .. 2d at 774. 
9 /d. at 561-62, 215 N.E.2d at 775. 
10 !d. at 562, 215 N.E.2d at 775. 
11 /d. at 563, 215 N.E.2d at 776. 
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After the decision in Harrison I, the town amended its by-laws to 
provide access to the industrial zone. The amendment authorized the 
board of appeals to grant special permits so that residential lots not 
then used for access could be so used. The amendment also changed 
the classification of residential parcels which had been used for access 
roads so as to permit that use. 12 The Land Court ruled that the 
amendment was invalid. 13 The Supreme Judicial Court in Harrison v. 
Town of Braintree (Harrison II) 14 held that the amendment provision 
authorizing the board of appeals to issue a special permit for access 
roads across residential land was valid since "[the] very limited non-
residential use [was] not necessarily inconsistent with the dominant 
residential purpose."15 The Court further held, however, that the re-
zoning of the parcels with existing access roadways was done not be-
cause that use was reasonable for each parcel, but rather, because the 
access use over them existed. Thus, the provision of the amendment 
authorizing such rezoning was invalid. 16 The Court suggested that the 
town lay out public ways, extend the industrial district to existing pub-
lic ways, or allow access use of particular lots by special permit. 17 
Following the decision in Harrison II, the board of appeals granted a 
special permit for a proposed new access road near the plaintiffs 
land. While appeal from the grant of that permit was pending, the 
town voted to convert the proposed new access road into a town way, 
and before the orders of taking were recorded, the owner of the 
proposed new access road dedicated the road to the town as a public 
way.'H In the 1975 Survey year decision in Harrison v. Textron, Inc. 
(Harrison III), 1 ~ the Supreme Judicial Court first affirmed the 
superior court's ruling that the proposed road would not materially 
affect the use and enjoyment of plaintiffs property. 20 The Court then 
rejected plaintiffs contention that a public way may be used only for 
purposes which are permitted in the zoning district: "If the issue were 
before us squarely, we would rule that the use of a public way is not 
restricted by local zoning provisions."21 Moreover, the zoning by-law 
authorized the issuance of special permits which allowed public or 
private ways in residential zones to be used as access routes to other 
zoning districts. 
12 See Harrison v. Town of Braintree, 355 Mass. 651,652,654,247 N.E.2d 356,357, 
359 (1969). 
13 /d. at 652, 247 N.E.2d at 357. 
14 355 Mass. 651, 247 N.E.2d 356 (1969). 
15 /d. at 655, 247 N .E.2d at 359. 
16 /d. at 656, 247 N.E.2d at 360. 
17 /d. 
18 See Harrison v. Textron, Inc., 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1239, 1241-42, 328 N.E.2d 838, 
840-41. 
19 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1239, 328 N .E.2d 838. This action also consolidated appeals 
from several nuisance actions. 
20 /d. at 1245-46, 1265, 328 N.E.2d at 842, 848. 
21 Id. at 1250-51, 328 N.E.2d at 843. 
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Harrison III should be read narrowly. As Harney and Harrison I and 
II indicate, the Court will not tolerate nonconforming access routes 
through residentially zoned land unless the locality expressly approves 
such routes. 22 This approval may take the form of a special permit 
provision, requiring a determination of the suitability of each pro-
posed road, or a zoning by-law amendment. Another option is the ded-
ication of the privately owned property to the town or city for use as 
a public way. If the locality acknowledges a public need for a particu-
lar route, it may take the property by eminent domain. This last 
method may be particularly attractive to the owner of the site of the 
proposed road. He can acquire the desired access route, but avoid the 
costs of construction. Without some type of local approval, however, 
nonconforming access roads will not withstand a court challenge. 
§ 19.9. Jurisdiction: Failure to File Decision Within Sixty 
Days. In Crosby v. Board of Appeals of Weston, 1 the Appeals Court re-
fused to invalidate a variance merely because the local board of ap-
peals did not render its decision within the prescribed sixty-day time 
period.2 The decision conforms with previous cases that have held 
that such failures are not jurisdictional defects. In Cullen v. Building 
Inspector of North Attleborough, 3 the board of appeals' decision with re-
spect to an appeal from a building permit was five days late. The 
Supreme Judicial Court stated that the time requirement did "not go 
to the essence of' the validity of the variance4 and therefore was "di-
rectory and not mandatory."5 In Scott v. Board of Appeals of Wellesley, 6 
the plaintiffs had begun construction of a swimming pool with notice 
that their building permit was being appealed. The board of appeals 
subsequently revoked the permit, although not within the statutory 
ninety-day period. The Supreme Judicial Court held that this failure 
"was not a jurisdictional defect" invalidating the board's decision. 7 
Shuman v. Board of Alderm,en of Newton 8 was the first case to raise this 
issue after a 1969 amendment9 shortened the time requirement from 
ninety to sixty days. There the Court sustained the board's decision 
22 Id. at 1251, 328 N.E.2d at 843. 
§19.9. 1 1975 Mass. App. Ct.·Adv. Sh. 321, 323 N.E.2d 772. 
2 Id. at 321-22, 323 N,E.2d at 773. G.L. c. 40A, § 18 provides in part: "The decision 
of the board shall be made within sixty days after the date of the filing of an appeal, 
application or petition." 
3 353 Mass. 671, 234 N.E.2d 727 (1968), noted in 1968 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§ 12.1, 
at 341-43. 
4 353 Mass. at 679-80, 234 N.E.2d at 732, quoting Cheney v. Coughlin, 201 Mass. 204, 
211,87 N.E.2d 744,747 (1909). 
5 353 Mass. at 680, 234 N.E.2d at 732. 
8 356 Mass. 159, 248 N.E.2d 281 (1969). 
7 Id. at 162, 248 N.E.2d at 283. 
8 361 Mass. 758, 282 N.E.2d 653, noted in 1972 ANN. SuRV. MASS. LAW§ 22.11, at 
637-39. 
9 Acts of 1969, c. 870, § 1. 
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when it was filed "within a reasonable time" after the application for 
the special permit had been submitted. In addition, the Court noted 
that the late filing did not adversely affect the applicant's neighbors. 10 
In Crosby, the Court's liberal reading of section 18 of chapter 40A 
of the General Laws contains no expressed qualifications. Before waiv-
ing the sixty-day requirement, however, the court did acknowledge 
the strong evidence supporting the grant of the variance." As in 
prior cases, the court was reluctant to overturn on a technicality a 
well-grounded decision of the board of appeals. 
§ 19.10. Remedies: Destruction of a Noncomplying Building. 
Destruction of a building which violates existing zoning provisions is 
not a favored remedy. The resulting economic loss runs contrary to 
equitable principles and is usually avoided if an alternative remedy is 
available. However, even if an offending structure is modifiable, its 
removal will be ordered when there is evidence of bad faith by the 
building's owner. In Building Inspector of Falmouth v. Haddad, 1 the Ap-
peals Court demonstrated its willingness to impose this severe sanction 
where the zoning ordinance was knowingly violated. 
The land in the Haddad case consisted of four adjacent lots which 
originally comprised a single parcel. The parcel, which was located in 
a single-residence district, originally contained two structures: a ga-
rage converted into a two-room cottage and a ten-bedroom house 
which had been operated as a licensed boardinghouse for twenty 
years.2 After the main house was destroyed by fire, the parcel was di-
vided into the four lots. Building permits were issued for the con-
struction of single-family residences for lots 1 and 3, a single-family, 
two-story dwelling for lot 4. No application for a building permit was 
made for lot 2. Prior to the commencement of construction, the de-
fendants (trustees) were informed by the building inspector that an 
inn could not be constructed without a special permit. 3 Later, the 
trustees were issued an innholders license which contained the stipula-
tion that "the structure and location shall be substantially the same as 
under the previous license." Construction on all four lots commenced 
in March 1972, but on April 18 the building inspector ordered an 
immediate stop to all work because of various zoning and sanitation 
violations. Because the building on lot 4 was already fully framed 'and 
boarded in, the trustees were allowed to close it in to protect it from 
the weather. They "closed in" the building by constructing two 
porches and by performing extensive exterior finishing work. 4 All 
10 361 Mass. at 764-65 n.9, 282 N.E.2d at 658-59 n.9. 
11 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 321, 323 N.E.2d at 773. 
§19.10. 1 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 365, 324 N.E.2d 386. 
2 /d. at 367-68, 324 N.E.2d at 387-89. 
3 Id. at 368-69 & n.3, 324 N.E.2d at 389 & n.3. 
4 /d. at 369-70, 324 N.E.2d at 389. 
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outstanding sewer and building permits for the lots were subsequently 
revoked.~ 
The superior court enjoined further construction on the four lots 
and ordered the removal of the structures. 6 The Appeals Court first 
held that the injunction was overly broad because it prohibited even 
construction which conformed to the zoning by-law. 7 It then found that 
"the intended use of the structures erected on lots 1, 2, and 3 [is] 
permissible under the zoning by-law, which allows the construction of 
single-family dwellings."H The court therefore held that the orders di-
recting the removal of those structures be modified to provide for a 
reasonable time period in which the trustees could bring the plans 
into conformity with the zoning and sanitation provisions.H Finally, the 
court accepted the superior court's finding that the structure erected 
on lot 4 was "an inn or similar commercial establishment" rather than 
a single-family residence. 10 The court affirmed the superior court's is-
suance of the mandatory injunction ordering the building's destruc-
tion because the structure could not be used, or modified to be used, 
as a single-family residence, 11 and the trustees had been repeatedly 
warned and knew that a special permit was necessary for the construc-
tion of an inn. 12 Because the trustees had proceeded with "fully dem-
onstrated" bad faith, the court refused to stay the demolition order 
while they applied for the necessary special permit. 13 
The Haddad case demonstrates that the court will not sanction fla-
grant disregard•of zoning requirements. Complete removal of an entire 
building will be ordered if there appears to be a deliberate attempt to 
circumvent zoning provisions. Absent a showing of bad faith, how-
ever, unnecessarily severe remedies will be avoided. For example, in 
Building Inspector of Dennis v. Harney, 14 the superior court had ordered 
the erection of a permanent barricade across a nonpermitted access 
road. 1 ~ This would have prevented even the landowners from using 
5 Id. at 371-72, 324 N.E.2d at 389-90. 
6 /d. at 366, 324 N.E.2d at 389. 
7 Id. at 377, 324 N.E.2d at 391. 
8 Id. at 375, 324 N.E.2d at 391. 
9 /d. at 377, 324 N.E.2d at 391. 
10 Id. at 373 & n.7, 324 N.E.2d at 390 & n.7. 
11 Id. at 375-76, 324 N.E.2d at 391. Accord, Sterling v. Poulin, 1974 Mass. App. Ct. 
Adv. Sh. 901, 316 N.E.2d 737: 
The true inquiry in each case is whether the building or structure is legally usable 
(or modifiable and legally usable) and is intended to be used for a main or acces-
sory use which is permitted by the applicable ordiance or by-law. 
ld. at 903, 316 N.E.2d at 739. 
12 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 376, 324 N.E.2d at 390. 
Ia I d. 
14 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 923., 317 N.E.2d 81. For a detailed discussion of 
Harney, see § 19.8 supra. 
15 See 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 924,317 N.E.2d at 82. 
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the blocked section of their property. The Appeals Court modified 
the order to provide a "less drastic" solution in the form of a remova-
ble chain or locked gate. 16 While this approach is the more usual, the 
Haddad decision warns that severe measures will be ordered where 
warranted. 
§ 19.11. Remedies: Invalid Variance for Federally Funded Hous-
ing. In Cass v. Board of Appeal of Fall River, 1 the board of appeals 
had granted a variance for the construction of low and moderate in-
come housing on a parcel zoned to permit no more than three-family 
residences. The federally funded proposed development was a turn-
key project, i.e., the developer constructs the housing, then sells or 
leases it to the local housing authority.2 The Appeals Court applied 
the standards of section 15(3) of chapter 40A of the General Laws 
and ordered the variance annulled. The court found that there were 
no conditions peculiar to the parcel which did not affect the entire 
district. Moreover, a general community shortage for large families 
does not constitute a "hardship, financial or otherwise, to the 
app~llant. "3 Thus, the board had exceeded its authority in granting the 
vanance. 
Justices Goodman and Keville disagreed with the final disposition of 
the case because annulment of the variance could result in the city's 
losing considerable federal funds allocated to it for the construction of 
low-cost housing.4 Furthermore, a need existed for the housing. 5 
Since the project apparently could be considered under the Anti-Snob 
Zoning Law, 6 the two justices recommended postponing the annul-
ment of the variance pending an application to the board under the 
procedures of that statute. This, they said, would accord with the ob-
jective of the statute to " 'provid[e] for the critical regional need for 
low and moderate income housing.' "7 
Although the suggestion of the two justices appears sound, the deci-
sion of the majority should serve to warn developers of low and mod-
18 /d. at 925, 317 N .E.2d at 83. 
§19.11.1 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 893,317 N.E.2d 77. 
2 /d. at 893-94, 317 N .E.2d at 78. 
3 Id. at 894, 317 N.E.2d at 78, quoting G.L. c. 40A, § 15(3) (emphasis added). 
4 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 897-98, 317 N.E.2d at 80. 
5 Id. 
8 G.L. c. 40B, §§ 20-23. See Board of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Comm. 
in the Dept. of Community Affairs, 363 Mass. 339, 368 n.20, 294 N.E.2d 393, 414 n.20 
(1973). 
7 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 898-99, 317 N.E.2d at 80-81, quoting Board of Appeals of 
Hanover v. Housing Appeals Comm. in the Dept. of Community Affairs, 363 Mass. 
339, 360, 294 N.E.2d 393, 410. See also Kelloway v. Board of Appeal of Melrose, 361 
Mass. 249, 280 N.E.2d 160 (1972), noted in 1972 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 22.12, at 
642-43. In Kelloway, the Supreme Judicial Court permitted publicly funded housing 
built under an invalid variance to remain standing since demolition would "frustrate the 
[project's] public purpose." 361 Mass. at 256, 280 N.E.2d at 165. 
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erate income housing to carefully consider the appropriate procedural 
route before applying for building permits. 
§ 19.12. Public Utilities: Extent of Local Auth)l,rity. During the 
1975 Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court in Sa've the Bay, Inc. v. 
Department of Public Utilities' and New England LNG Co. v. Fall River2 
decided issues concerning the distribution between state and local au-
thorities of control over the use of land by a public service corpora-
tion. The two related cases3 concerned a proposed natural gas process-
ing plant and storage facility to be constructed on a 22.17-acre site 
contiguous to Mount Hope Bay in Fall River. 4 In July 1971, New 
England LNG Co. (the company) applied to the Department of Public 
Utilities (DPU), under section 10 of chapter 40A of the General Laws5 
for an exemption of its land and facility from the operation of the 
Fall River zoning ordinance.6 The company further requested ap-
proval of its methods for storing, transporting and distributing the 
propane and liquified natural gas. 7 Both requests were granted in De-
cember of 1971.8 
The DPU approvals were first challenged in Pereira v. New England 
LNG Co. 9 In Pereira, the superior court declared that the facility 
could not be used for its intended purposes until licenses to store and 
process the gas were obtained from municipal authorities; an injunc-
tion to enforce the decree was also issued. 10 Under one statute, such a 
municipal license was apparently required; 11 another statute, however, 
vested authority to regulate and control the storage, transportation 
§19.12. 1 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 139, 322 N.E.2d 742. 
2 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2183, 331 N.E.2d 536. 
3 A third case, Pereira v. New England LNG Co., 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1207, 301 
N.E.2d 441, involved similar issues and the same facility. 
4 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 141-42, 322 N.E.2d at 746-47. 
5 G.L. c. 40A, § 10 provides: 
A building, structure or land used or to be used by a public service corporation 
may be exempted from the operation of a zoning ordinance or by-law if, upon pe-
tition of the corporation, the department of public utilities shall, after public notice 
and hearing, decide that the present or proposed situation of the building, struc-
ture or land in question is reasonably necessary for the convenience or welfare of 
the public. 
6 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 142, 322 N.E.2d at 747. Although the locus was within an 
industrial zone, the proposed facility was not a use permitted in the district. /d. 
7 Id. at 140 n.3, 143, 322 N.E.2d at 746 n.3, 747. This request was filed pursuant to 
G.L. c. 164, § 105A. 
8 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2185-86, 331 N.E.2d at 538. 
9 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1207, 301 N.E.2d 441. 
10 Id. at 1207, 301 N.E.2d at 442. 
11 G.L. c. 148, § 13, which provides in part: 
No building or other structure shall ... be used for the keeping, storage, manufac-
ture or sale of [gunpowder, dynamite, crude petroleum or its products, or any 
other explosives] unless the local licensing authority shall have granted a license to 
use the land on which such building ... is to be situated for the aforementioned 
uses .... 
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and distribution of gas in the DPU. 12 The Supreme Judicial Court 
held that a gas company which has obtained DPU approval of its 
methods for storing, transporting and distributing gas need not obtain 
a municipal license for the same operations. 13 The Court found that 
the statute vesting authority in DPU was both more specific and more 
recently adopted than the statute requiring municipal licenses; thus, 
the former controlled. 14 More importantly, the Court found a legisla-
tive intent to grant "paramount power" over the subject matter to 
DPU in order to ensure that the satisfaction of the energy needs of 
the entire Commonwealth could not be thwarted by the actions of 
local authorities. 15 
After the decision in Pereira, a wide-ranging attack was made in 
Save the Bay, Inc. v. Department of Public Utilities 16 on the DPU's action 
in exempting the company from the local zoning ordinance pursuant 
to section 10 of chapter 40A of the General Laws. The company in-
tervened and demurred to the petitions for appeal on the ground that 
petitioners lacked standing. Petitioners raised issues of (1) the ade-
quacy of DPU's standards for providing notice; (2) the company's 
satisfaction of the exemption's "public service corporation" require-
ment; (3) the sufficiency of DPU's consideration of local interests and 
finding of reasonable necessity; and (4) the propriety of having the 
DPU hearing conducted by an employee rather than by the commis-
sioners. 
The company claimed that none of the petitioners were "aggrieved 
parties in interest," and they therefore lacked standing to bring an 
appeal. The petitioners included Save the Bay, Inc., a Rhode Island 
nonprofit corporation, Concerned Citizens of the South End, an un-
incorporated association, and several individual landowners, one of 
whom was Pereira, a member of the Concerned Citizens group. 17 The 
Court reviewed the requirements for standing to challenge a decision 
made by the DPU. Under section 5 of chapter 25 of the General 
Laws, petitioners must be an aggrieved party in interest. Under the 
State Administrative Procedure Act, 18 to be a "party" one must be: ( 1) 
a specifically named person whose legal rights or obligations are being 
determined in the proceeding; (2) a person entitled by law to partici-
pate in the proceeding who makes an appearance; or (3) a person 
12 G.L. c. 164, § 105A, which provides in part: "Authority to regulate and controlthe 
storage, transportation and distribution of gas and the pressure under which these op-
erations may respectively be carried on is hereby vested in the [Department of Public 
Utilities]." 
13 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1220-21, 301 N.E.2d at 449. 
14 /d. at 1216,301 N.E.2d at 447. 
15 Jd. at 1218-19, 301 N.E.2d at 448. 
16 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 139, 322 N.E.2d 742. 
17 Jd. at 141, 149, 322 N.E.2d at 747, 750. 
18 G.L. c. 30A. 
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permitted by the agency to intervene as a party. 1 H Neither of the or-
ganizations apparently could qualify for standing except as inter-
venors. Save the Bay, Inc. did not specifically allege that it had been 
permitted to intervene or was entitled to intervene; thus, the demur-
rer to its standing was sustained.20 Although the Concerned Citizens 
group had actively participated in the proceeding, it was an unincor-
porated association and, therefore, not a proper party to the 
litigationY Pereira, an abutter, apparently was entitled by law to in-
tervene in the proceeding. Since Concerned Citizens acted in the pro-
ceeding for Pereira as well as for itself, its active participation satisfied 
the requirement that he make an appearance. Thus, the Court found 
Pereira to have standing to bring the appeal. 22 
The Court next considered petitioner's allegation that the DPU 
standard for providing notice of a public hearing was inadequate. 
Since section 10 of chapter 40A of the General Laws does not specify 
the type of notice to be given, the Court held that notice must satisfy 
the requirements of section 11 ( 1) of chapter 30A of the General Laws. 
Section 11 ( 1) provides for reasonable notice to all parties of the time 
and place of the hearing and a statement of the issues involved. 23 As 
required by its regulations, DPU gives abutters notice by registered 
mail; others are not formally notified but must rely on notice pub-
lished in newspapers. The Court held the procedure not to be arbi-
trary on its face and found a presumption in favor of the reasonable-
ness of notice given in compliance with an administrative regulation. 24 
However, the Court suggested that the DPU reconsider its notice reg-
ulations with regard to parties who are separated from the proposed 
facility only by a public way. "[C]onsiderations of fairness might call 
for broader notice to interested parties."2 ·' 
The third issue raised on appeal was the company's status as a pub-
lic service corporation eligible for an exemption from local zoning re-
quirements under section 10 of chapter 40A of the General Laws. 26 
The standard of review applicable to this issue limited the Court to 
deciding whether the DPU's determination of the company's status 
was erroneous as a matter of law. 27 Petitioners argued that since the 
company was not organized under section 75B of chapter 164 of the 
General Laws, it did not qualify as a public service corporation. 28 The 
19 /d. § 1(3). 
20 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 148, 173, 322 N.E.2d at 749, 758. 
21 /d. at 149, 173, 322 N.E.2d at 750, 758. 
22 /d. at 149-51,322 N.E.2d at 750. 
23 /d. at 151 n.7, 322 N.E.2d at 750 n.7. 
24 /d. at 152, 322 N.E.2d at 751. 
25 ld. at 153, 322 N.E.2d at 751. 
26 /d. at 154-64, 322 N.E.2d at 751-55. 
27 Id. at 155, 322 N.E.2d at 752. 
28 /d. at 158, 322 N.E.2d at 753. 
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Court, however, found the definition of public service corporation to 
be broader, and that some of the relevant considerations are: 
whether the corporation is organized pursuant to an appropriate 
franchise from the State to provide for a necessity or convenience 
to the general public which could not be furnished through the 
ordinary channels of private business; whether the corporation is 
subject to the requisite degree of governmental control and regu-
lation; and the nature of the public benefit to be derived from the 
service provided. 29 
DPU had determined the existence of a state and regional need for 
an increased supply of natural gas, which need the company would 
help satisfy. Petitioners contended that the company might never 
serve any citizen of the Commonwealth. Although the Court found 
the DPU determination supported by the evidence, it suggested that 
distribution to the public in the Commonwealth and the region might 
be essential if the company was to preserve its status as a public serv-
ice corporation.30 The Court further found that the required degree 
of governmental control was present because the company was subject 
to regulations of the Federal Power Commission and the DPU.31 
Thus, the designation of the company as a public service corporation 
was not improper. 
The petitioners next argued that DPU had incorrectly applied the 
reasonable necessity standard of section 10 of chapter 40A of the 
General Laws, particularly since it had not sufficiently considered 
local interests. 32 The Court first held there was sufficient evidence to 
support the finding of reasonable necessity. Moreover, DPU had ade-
quately considered local environmental and safety interests. Then the 
Court held that it was proper for DPU to consider the needs not only 
of Massachusetts but also those of the region. Although it recognized 
the special burden placed on Fall River by the proposed facility, the 
Court stated that "at some point local interests must be balanced 
against the general interests of the citizenry as a whole."33 
Finally, the Court held that it was not error for the DPU hearing to 
be conducted by an employee rather than by the commissioners. The 
procedure was authorized by statute and was similar to reference of a 
court case to a master. 34 
The final challenge to construction of the facility in Fall River came 
in New England LNG Co. v. Fall River. 35 Shortly after the Pereira 
29 /d. at 159, 322 N.E.2d at 753. 
30 See id. at 159-60, 164, 322 N.E.2d at 754, 755. 
31 /d. at 162-63, 322 N.E.2d at 754. 
32 Jd. at 164-72, 322 N.E.2d at 755-57. 
33 /d. at 170,322 N.E.2d at 757. 
34 /d. at 172,322 N.E.2d at 757. 
35 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2183, 331 N.E.2d 536. 
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decision, the city amended its general ordinances, as distinguished 
from its zoning by-laws, by adding new specifications for storage tank 
height, capacity and setback. 36 The building inspector denied the 
company's application for a building permit on the ground that the 
plans for construction of the facility did not conform to the specifica-
tions required by the ordinance.37 The company sought a declaration 
that the ordinance was unenforceable as well as a writ of mandamus 
ordering the building inspector to issue the permit. 38 
The city contended it had authority to enact the amended ordi-
nance under either section 75 of chapter 164 of the General Laws, 
which permits towns to regulate the activities of gas companies that 
may in any manner affect the health, safety, convenience or property 
of the towns' inhabitants,3H or section 6 of the Home Rule Amend-
ment to the Massachusetts Constitution,40 which permits towns to ex-
ercise any power conferable on them by the Legislature which is con-
sistent with the state Constitution or with state statutes. 41 In dealing 
with the city's first contention, the Supreme Judicial Court found the 
ordinance to be inconsistent with section 105A of chapter 164 of the 
General Laws, which vests in DPU the regulatory authority over stor-
age, transportation and distribution of gas. The city's authority under 
section 75 had to give way to DPU's authority under section 105A be-
cause the latter section was both more specific and more recently 
adopted. 42 In addition, this conflict with section 105A lead the Court 
to conclude that the city lacked authority under the Home Rule 
Amendment to enact the ordinance because the ordinance conflicted 
with a statute enacted by the Legislature "in conformity with the pow-
ers reserved to it .... "43 The Court ordered the building inspector to 
issue the permit. 44 
These cases are illustrative of situations in which localities are being 
required to yield to the state in controlling land use. By vesting in 
DPU the power to approve or disapprove proposed public utility 
facilities, the Legislature implicitly placed such facilities beyond the 
scope of local restrictions. The Court, acknowledging the supremacy 
36 Id. at 2187-88, 331 N.E.2d at 538. 
37 Id. at 2188-89, 331 N.E.2d at 538-39. 
38 Id. at 2183, 331 N.E.2d at 537. 
39 Id. at 2190-91, 331 N.E.2d at 539. 
40 MASS. CONST. amend. art. II, § 6. 
41 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2192-94, 331 N.E.2d at 540. 
42 /d. at 2190-91,331 N.E.2d at 539. 
43 Id. at 2194, 331 N.E.2d at 540. The Court found it unnecessary to rule in the 
company's claims that the ordinance was invalid because it was an attempt to regulate 
land use without complying with the procedures for amending zoning ordinances, id. at 
2191-92, 331 N.E.2d at 539-40, or because it constituted an unreasonable burden on in-
terstate commerce, id. at 2194, 331 N.E.2d at 541. 
44 Id. at 2195, 331 N.E.2d at 541. 
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of the specific public utilities statute, affirmed the power of state con-
trol in this area. The result is a logical one, for if localities were al-
lowed to countermand decisions made by DPU pursuant to its statu-
tory authority, the Legislature's purpose in granting the DPU such au-
thority would be undermined. 
The resolution of the issues in Save the Bay, Inc. v. Department of Pub-
lic Utilities indicates the extent of the discretion exercised by DPU in 
granting exemptions from local zoning requirements to public service 
corporations. By giving a fairly narrow interpretation to the qualifica-
tions needed to challenge a DPU decision, the Court restricted the 
number of appeals which it will hear from DPU rulings. Nevertheless, 
the dicta concerning adequate notice and consideration of local in-
terests indicates that the Court may intervene if DPU oversteps its au-
thority. 
§19.13. Pending Subdivision Plan: Applicability of Zoning 
Amendment. Preservation of the existing land use balance on the is-
lands of Nantucket Sound has been the subject of proposals at both the 
federal and local levels. Influenced perhaps by the rapir:lly expanding 
population on neighboring Cape Cod and faced with the prospect of 
strict federal land use controls, the town of Tisbury, on Martha's Vin-
eyard, amended its zoning by-laws by doubling the minimum lot size 
requirement for subdivision developments. In Chira v. Planning Board 
of Tisbury, 1 the Appeals Court considered the applicability of this 
change to a subdivision plan filed with the planning board prior to 
the adoption of the amendment. 
In early 1973, the plaintiffs (applicants) filed with the planning 
board preliminary and revised plans for a conventional, grid-like 
subdivision on a 107-acre tract. Thereafter, a town meeting voted to 
amend the local zoning by-law to increase the minimum lot size from 
25,000 square feet to 50,000 square feet; the applicants' plans con-
formed to the former requirement but not to the latter. The amend-
ment was then submitted to the Attorney General for his approval as 
required by section 32 of chapter 40 of the General Laws. In May, 
1973, the applicants filed a second preliminary plan for the same 
locus; this time a "cluster development" subdivision was proposed.2 
The Attorney General approved the zoning amendment on August 7, 
1973, and it was last published on August 28. Both a definitive grid 
plan and a definitive cluster plan were filed. The planning board dis-
approved both definitive plans because they violated the minimum lot 
size requirements of the amended by-law.3 
The applicants challenged the decision of the planning board. The 
trial court found that both plans were governed by the zoning laws in 
§19.13. 1 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1034, 333 N.E.2d 204. 
2 /d. at 1034, 1037, 333 N.E.2d at 206, 207. 
3 /d. at 1038, 333 N.E.2d at 207. 
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effect prior to the 1973 amendment, and the board, therefore, had 
improperly disapproved the plans.4 The Appeals Court agreed that 
the applicants' plans were entitled to approvaJ.S Under section 32 of 
chapter 40, a by-law amendment does not take effect until it has been 
approved by the Attorney General and published. Section 7 A of chap-
ter 40A of the General Laws provides that definitive subdivision plans 
are "governed by the applicable provisions of the zoning ... by-law in 
effect at the time of the submission of [the preliminary plans] while 
such ... plans are being processed .... "6 Since both preliminary 
plans had been submitted prior to the Attorney General's approval of 
the 1973 amendment, the amendment was not "in effect" with regard 
to the definitive plans. 7 The court distinguished Doliner v. Planning 
Board of Millis 8 because the decision in that case relied on a version of 
section 7 A which required that a preliminary plan be approved before 
it was afforded protection.9 The court also rejected the planning 
board's contention that the grid plan was properly rejected because 
the applicants never had intended to implement it. Nothing in the 
Subdivision Control Law prevents "an owner from engaging in the 
fruitless exercise of filing subdivision plans which he never intends to 
utilize."10 
The court's decision in Chira effectuates the purpose of section 7 A 
which is "to protect a developer from zoning changes during the 
planning stage." 11 This purpose is perhaps even broad enough to pro-
tect the developer who files alternative plans before the effective date 
of a zoning change in order to both avoid the effects of new zoning 
and retain several development options. If the intended protection is 
not so broad, the remedy should be devised by the Legislature, not by 
the judiciary. 
4 See id. 
5 !d. at 1039, 333 N.E.2d at 207. Since the trial court had remanded the case to the 
Planning Board for further consideration, its decree was interlocutory and the appeal 
was dismissed. !d. at 1036, 333 N.E.2d at 206-07. See Roberts-Haverhill Associates v. 
City Council of Haverhill, 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 2159, 319 N.E.2d 916. The 
court, however, considered the issues because (1) the procedural error might have been 
induced by recent procedural changes, (2) the briefs on both sides argued the merits, 
and (3) resolution of the issues would expedite further proceedings. 1975 Mass. App. 
Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1036, 333 N.E.2d at 207. 
6 See 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1039, 333 N.E.2d at 207-08 (emphasis added by 
court). 
7 !d. at 1039, 333 N.E.2d at 208. 
8 343 Mass. 1, 175 N.E.2d 919 (1961), noted in 1961 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§ 18.32, at 
220-22. 
9 Compare 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1039-40, 333 N.E.2d at 208 with 343 Mass. 
at 7-8 & n.3, 175 N.E.2d at 923 & n.3. 
10 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1042, 333 N.E.2d at 208-09. 
11 Nyquist v. Board of Appeals of Acton, 359 Mass. 462, 465, 269 N.E.2d 654, 656 
(1971}, noted in 1971 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§ 17.6, at 496-97. 
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§19.14. Pending Trailer Park Use: Effect of Zoning Amend-
ment. Under section 7 A of the Zoning Enabling Act, 1 a land plan 
which does not require approval under the Subdivision Control Law 
enjoys a three-year exemption from any subsequent zoning amend-
ment which would otherwise affect the proposed use of the land. In 
Rayco Investment Corp. v. Board of Selectmen of Raynham, 2 the town at-
tempted to prevent a landowner from claiming this statutory immuni-
ty by contending that a newly enacted by-law was not a zoning 
amendment, but rather an exercise of the town's general police 
power. In its examination of this claim, the Supreme Judicial Court 
clarified the scope of section 7 A protection and delineated the sources 
of authority for regulating trailer parks. 
The plaintiff owned a parcel of land which was zoned so that a 
trailer park would be a permitted use. 3 His predecessor in title had 
submitted a plan for the parcel to the town's planning board. On Oc-
tober 14, 1971, the board endorsed the plan with the notation "ap-
proval under the subdivision control law not required."4 Four days 
later the town adopted a by-law limiting the number of licenses that 
could be issued for trailer parks to the number of licenses that had 
been issued as of October 1, 1971.5 In early November, 1972, the 
plaintiff applied to the town board of health for a license to operate a 
trailer park on the tract. The denial of his application was based on 
the existence of the 1971 by-law. 6 
The plaintiff sought a declaration that section 7 A of chapter 40A of 
the General Laws protected his property from the operation of the 
by-law. 7 The superior court rejected the claim, ruling that the 1971 
by-law was enacted under the town's police power and was "not to be 
construed as an amendment to the zoning by-law."8 The Supreme 
Judicial Court ordered direct appellate review. 
The town's main contention was that the 1971 by-law was not a zon-
ing amendment and thus was not subject to section 7 A. However, 
since the record did not indicate the manner in which the law had 
been adopted, the Court examined the plaintiffs right to the license 
under two conditions: (1) if the by-law were a properly-enacted zoning 
amendment; and (2) if the procedural requirements for amending a 
zoning law were not fulfilled. 9 _ 
First, assuming that the by-law had been adopted as a zoning 
§19.14. I G.L. c. 40A, § 7A. 
2 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2375, 331 N.E.2d 910. 
3 /d. at 2376-77, 331 N.E.2d at 911. 
4 /d. at 2376,331 N.E.2d at 911. 
5Jd. 
6 /d. at 2377, 331 N.E.2d at 911. 
7 /d. at 2375, 2377-78, 331 N.E.2d at 911. 
8 See id. at 2378, 331 N.E.2d at 911. 
9 /d. at 2379-80, 2382, 331 N.E.2d at 912, 913. 
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amendment, it was clear that section 7 A "[bore] on the applicability of 
the 1971 by-law to the plaintiffs property."10 The town, however, 
contended that the statute's protection against changes in the "use of 
the land" does not include the type of change made by the 1971 by-
law. In Bellows Farms, Inc. v. Building Inspector of Acton, 11 the Court 
held that zoning amendments that had the effect of reducing the in-
tensity of apartment units but which did not prohibit use of the land 
for apartments were not changes in the "use of the land."12 Similarly, 
the town argued that the 1971 amendment did not preclude the use 
of the parcel as a trailer park, because the plaintiff might obtain a 
license if another license holder ceased operations. 13 The Court, how-
ever, ruled that the by-law was a "'virtual prohibition' of the use of 
land for trailer park purposes .... "14 Thus, the Court held that if the 
1971 amendment was a properly enacted zoning amendment, section 
7A would protect plaintiffs land from the operation of the by-law, 
and the application for the trailer park license would be unaffected by 
the by-law. 15 
The Court then considered the alternative possibility that the 1971 
amendment did not comply with the procedural requirements of the 
Zoning Enabling Act. From this perspective, the town contended that 
the 1971 by-law was an exercise of its general police power rather 
than its zoning power, and thus was not subject to section 7 A's 
provisions. 16 The Court acknowledged that trailer parks may be sub-
ject to regulation by towns as an exercise of their police power .1 7 
However, it held that the by-law involved in the instant case had the 
"nature and effect ... of an exercise of the zoning power,"18 and 
therefore must be viewed as a zoning regulation. Three factors en-
tered into the determination that the by-law was an exercise of the 
zoning power: (1) the by-law was within the scope of the town's zon-
ing power; 19 (2) prior to the adoption of the amendment, the town's 
zoning by-laws comprehensively regulated trailer parks, hence the 
1971 amendment "necessarily modified the earlier by-law; "20 and (3) 
"similar by-laws have been adopted in the past by municipalities as 
zoning by-laws."21 Thus, if the amendment had not been adopted 
10 Id. at 2380, 331 N.E.2d at 912. 
11 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1399, 303 N.E.2d 728, noted in 1974 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 
16.20, at 374-76. 
12 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1401-02, 303 N.E.2d at 733-34. 
13 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2380, 331 N.E.2d at 912. 
14 I d. at 2382, 331 N.E.2d at 913. 
15 I d. 
1& /d. 
17 Id. at 2384-85, 331 N.E.2d at 914. 
18 Id. at 2385, 331 N.E.2d at 914. 
19 Id. See Granby v. Landry, 341 Mass. 443,445-46, 170 N.E.2d 364, 366 (1960). 
20 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2386, 331 N.E.2d at 914 .. 15. 
21 Id. at 2385, 331 N.E.2d at 914. 
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pursuant to the procedures required by the Zoning Enabling Act, it 
was without effect and could not be relied on to defeat the application 
for the trailer park license.22 
The Court in Rayco examined the implications of a conclusion that 
the by-law was an exercise of the town's police power. If this conclu-
sion were to be reached, "the assorted protections contained in the 
Zoning Enabling Act would in many instances be circumvented, 
thereby defeating the purposes of the statute."23 For example, if the 
police power were used to limit the number of mobile homes in this 
case, another town might label an attempt to limit apartment build-
ings as a general health regulation, thereby ignoring the stricter re-
quirements of the zoning power. Such an approach, the Court stated, 
"views the municipal power in a vacuum, whereas the law is clear that 
a municipality's 'independent police powers ... cannot be exercised in 
a manner which frustrates the purpose or implementation of a ... law 
enacted by the Legislature .... ' "24 
The Rayco decision is noteworthy in two respects. First, it guards 
against an interpretation of Bellows Farms which would deny section 
7A protection wherever there was any possibility, however remote, of 
the availability of an intended use on a particular tract. Under the 
present approach, a plan would be protected if a subsequent zoning 
amendment "impedes the reasonable use of the land."25 Second, the 
decision reinforced the scope of the Zoning Enabling Act. It serves to 
insure that a municipality cannot avoid the requirements of the en-
abling act merely by labeling a zoning by-law an exercise of the gen-
eral police power. 
B. St:BDIVISION CoNTROL 
§19.15. Subdivision Control: Dead-End Streets. In Sparks v. 
Planning Board of Westborough, 1 abutters sought to have annulled the 
planning board's approval of a definitive subdivision plan. The plan 
provided for two perpendicular roadways forming aT-shape; the sole 
access from· a public way was provided at the base of the T. The roads 
were to each be slightly less than 600 feet in length; together, they 
were to provide access to thirteen lots. Planning board regulations re-
quired dead-end streets to be no longer than 600 feet and to provide 
access to no more than twelve lots.2 Plaintiffs contended that the two 
22 /d. at 2388, 331 N.E.2d at 915. 
23 !d. at 2386-87, 331 N.E.2d at 915. 
24 /d. at 2387, 331 N.E.2d at 915, quoting Board of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing 
Appeals Comm. in the Dept. of Community Affairs, 363 Mass. 339, 360, 294 N .E.2d 
393, 409 (1973). 
25 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2382, 331 N.E.2d at 913. 
§19.15. 1 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 2217, 321 N.E.2d 666. 
2 /d. at 2220, 321 N.E.2d at 668. 
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roadways would constitute a single dead-end street, and therefore, the 
roads would exceed the norms of the regulations.3 
The Appeals Court rejected plaintiffs' contention. Neither state nor 
local authority had adequately defined "dead-end street." Thus, the 
board could not have applied plaintiffs' interpretation of the regula-
tions without violating the requirement that board regulations be en-
forced "only to the extent that they are 'comprehensive, reasonably 
definite, and carefully drafted, so that owners may know in advance what 
is or may be required of them.' "4 Moreover, the court was disinclined to 
accept the proffered definition of "dead-end street." Treatment of 
combinations of subdivision roadways as a single dead-end street 
where there is only one means of access to them from a public way 
sweeps too broadly. 5 By not insisting on an access route to an existing 
primary street, the court allowed each subdivision road to be consid-
ered as a separate way. 
§'19.16. Subdivision Control: Constructive Approval of Submitted 
Plan. Under section 81 U of chapter 41 of the General Laws, the 
failure of a planning board to act on a proposed subdivision plan 
within the prescribed time is deemed to be an approval of the plan. 1 
In Pierce v. Town Clerk of Rochester, 2 the Appeals Court considered the 
legal effect of a planning board's letter to the petitioner explaining 
why no action would be taken on a submitted plan.3 The court, rather 
than finding the letter a disapproval of the plan, held that it was "a 
refusal to consider the plan which could and did ripen into construc-
tive approval thereof."4 The court recognized, however, that approval 
may not have been intended by the board.5 Therefore, judgment was 
not entered for sixty days, giving the board time to modify, amend, or 
rescind its constructive approval under section 81 W of chapter 41 of 
the General Laws.6 
3 /d. 
4 /d. at 2221, 321 N.E.2d at 668 (emphasis in original). 
• /d. at 2223, 321 N.E.2d at 669. 
§19.16. 1 G.L. c. 41, § 81U reads in part: 
Failure of the planning board either to take final action or to file with the city or 
town clerk a certificate of such action regarding a plan submitted by an applicant 
within sixty days after such submission . . . shall be deemed to be an approval 
thereof. 
2 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 461, 325 N.E.2d 300. 
3 Id. at 461, 325 N.E.2d at 301. 
4 /d. Accord, Kay-Vee Realty, Inc. v. Town Clerk of Ludlow, 355 Mass. 165, 168, 243 
N.E.2d 813, 814-15 (1969), noted in 1969 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§ 14.19, at 387-88 (con-
structive approval found where disapproval was conditional). But see Pieper v. Planning 
Board of Southborough, 340 Mass. 157, 162, 163 N.E.2d 14, 17 (1959), noted in 1960 
ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§ 13.7, at 142 (constructive approval not found where applicant 
treated board's decision as final). 
5 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 461, 325 N.E.2d at 301. 
8 /d. at 461, 325 N.E.2d at 301. Accord, Kay-Vee Realty, Inc. v. Town Clerk of Lud-
low, 355 Mass. 165, 170,243 N.E.2d 813,816 (1969). 
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§ 19.17. Subdivision Control: Applicability of Anti-Snob Zoning 
Law. Under the Anti-Snob Zoning Law,' a qualified applicant, in-
terested in building low and moderate income housing, may apply to 
the local zoning board of appeals (board of appeals) for a "com-
prehensive permit" instead of applying to the numerous local boards 
and officials having jurisdiction over the proposed construction. 2 The 
board of appeals, in granting a comprehensive permit, may override 
local regulations, such as zoning ordinances or by-laws, which hamper 
the construction of low and moderate income housing when such 
regulations are not "consistent with local needs."3 In Mahoney v. Board 
of Appeals of Winchester, 4 the Supreme Judicial Court held that the 
Anti-Snob Zoning Law authorizes the board of appeals to ignore or 
modify regulations adopted pursuant to the Subdivision Control Law5 
which are not consistent with local need, 6 and that such exemptions 
do not violate the equal protection rights of those community mem-
bers forced to comply with the requirements of the Subdivision Con-
trol Law. 7 
The plaintiffs, owners of property abutting land for which a com-
prehensive permit had been granted, claimed that the Anti-Snob Zon-
ing Law did not authorize the board of appeals to override the re-
quirements of the Subdivision Control Law. 8 The Court pointed out 
that under section 21,9 the board of appeals has " 'the same power to 
§19.17. I G.L. c. 40B, §§ 20-23. 
2 See generally Huber, Anti-Snob Zoning Law; 1969 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW 360; Rodgers, 
Snob Zoning in Massachusetts, 1970 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW 487. 
3 Board of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Comm. in the Dept. of Commu-
nity Affairs, 363 Mass. 339, 355, 294 N.E.2d 393, 407 (1973), noted in 1973 ANN. SuRv. 
MASS. LAW§ 12.10, at 415-22. 
4 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1419, 316 N.E.2d 606. 
5 G.L. c. 41, §§ 81K-81GG. Section SIN makes the Subdivision Control Law effective 
in those cities and towns that have approved it. Section SIQ provides that a local plan-
ning board may adopt rules and regulations designed to implement the law. 
6 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1423, 316 N.E.2d at 609. 
7 Id. at 1423-24, 316 N.E.2d at 609. 
8 Id. at 1422, 316 N.E.2d at 609. The Court, relying on Board of Appeals of Hanover 
v. Housing Appeals Comm. in the Dept. of Community Affairs, 363 Mass. 339, 294 
N.E.2d 393 (1973), summarily rejected the plaintiffs' additional claims that the Anti-
Snob Zoning Law was an unconstitutional delegation of power, was unconstitutionally 
vague, and permitted unconstitutional spot zoning. 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1422, 316 
N .E.2d at 608-09. 
The plaintiffs also contended that the procedures for appealing the decisions of the 
appeals board, which require a denied applicant to appeal first to the Housing Appeals 
Committee, G.L. c. 40B, § 22, but which allow any other "aggrieved person" to appeal 
directly to the district or superior court, G.L. c. 40B, § 21, deny equal access to the 
courts. The Court rejected the claim by stating that " 'there are no substantial differ-
ences between the alternative methods of review.'" 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1422, 316 
N.E.2d at 608, quoting Board of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Comm. in the 
Dept. of Community Affairs, 363 Mass. 339, 371,294 N.E.2d 393,416 (1973). 
9 G.L. c. 40B, § 21. 
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issue permits or approvals as any local board or official who would 
otherwise act with respect to such application.' "10 Since the agencies 
charged with implementing the Subdivision Control Law, the local 
planning board and the board of subdivision control appeals, 11 are 
such "local boards," the board of appeals may go beyond any provi-
sion of the Subdivision Control Law that is inconsistent with local 
needs.12 
The plaintiffs' second major contention was that they were denied 
equal protection of the laws by the board of appeals' exempting the 
applicant from the subdivision control requirements, while the plain-
tiffs, as abutters, were held to those provisions. 13 The Court indicated 
that the record did not show if the board of appeals had in fact mod-
ified or ignored the Subdivision Control Law. 14 Even if the board of 
appeals had, however, the Court stated there would be no equal pro-
tection violation. 15 Since the Legislature's authority to regulate zoning 
practices is "very broad,"16 the Court held that the appropriate stan-
dard of review was whether the Anti-Snob Zoning Law was " 'a 
reasonable means to serve a legitimate public purpose.' "17 Without 
considering whether the particular aspect of the Anti-Snob Zoning 
Law in question-the board of appeals ability to override the Subdivi-
sion Control Law-was reasonable, the Court held, based on Board of 
Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Committee in the Department of 
Community Affairs, 18 that the overall legislative scheme was 
reasonable. 19 
Mahoney reinforces the Court's support for the Anti-Snob Zoning 
Law as a legitimate remedy for exclusionary zoning practices. It 
should discourage further challenges to the law's substantive validity. 
C. EMINENT DoMAIN 
§19.18. Eminent Domain: Concurrent Remedies. In Raimondo v. 
Town of Burlington, 1 the Supreme Judicial Court was asked to deter-
mine whether a landowner may challenge the validity of a taking of 
her property and at the same time file a petition for the assessment of 
damages under section 14 of chapter 79 of the General Laws. The 
10 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1423, 316 N.E.2d at 609, quoting G.L. c. 40B, § 21. 
11 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1423, 316 N.E.2d at 609. 
12 /d. 
13 /d. at 1422-23, 316 N.E.2d at 609. 
14 !d. at 1423, 316 N.E.2d at 609. 
"Id. 
18 /d. 
17 /d. at 1424, 316 N.E.2d at 609. 
18 363 Mass. 339, 294 N.E.2d393 (1973). 
19 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1424, 316 N.E.2d at 609. 
§19.18. 1 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2236, 319 N.E.2d 395. 
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plaintiff filed a bill in equity contending that the town's taking of her 
property was void because the premises taken were not identified with 
sufficient accuracy, and because the taking was not for a proper pub-
lic purpose. 2 Before the equity suit had been determined, the plaintiff 
filed a petition under section 143 seeking an assessment of damages 
based on the same taking. 4 The town then filed a plea in abatement to 
the equity suit because of the plaintiffs requested assessment of 
damages.5 The superior court sustained the plea and dismissed 
plaintiffs bill, ruling that the plaintiff could not pursue both claims 
simultaneously. 6 
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed the superior court. 
The Court first noted that a party may follow inconsistent courses, 
successively or concurrently, in order to obtain complete relief. 7 Thus, 
the plaintiff could maintain her bill in equity while seeking damages 
under section 14 in superior court. 8 
The Court distinguished the cases of Preston v. City of Newton 9 and 
Barnes v. City of Springfield10 on the ground that they merely assert the 
rule that "a petition for the assessment of damages on account of a 
taking admits, for the purpose of that proceeding, the ... validity [of 
the taking]." 11 The Court went on to indicate that the rule of Preston 
and Barnes, to the extent that it depends on the inability to join alter-
native claims and suits in equity with actions at law, has been over-
ruled by Rule 18(a) of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure. 12 
Consequently, if no other justification exists for the rule of Preston 
and Barnes, a plaintiff may now be able to challenge the validity of a 
taking and seek an assessment of damages in the same action. 
§19.19. Eminent Domain: Admissibility of Assessed Valu-
ation. In Stewart v. Town of Burlington, 1 the Appeals Court inter-
2 /d. at 2236-37, 319 N.E.2d at 396. 
3 G.L. c. 79, § 14. 
4 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2237, 319 N.E.2d at 396. 
5Jd. 
6 /d. at 2236, 319 N.E.2d at 396. 
7 /d. at 2237, 319 N.E.2d at 396-97. 
8 /d. Accord, e.g., Radway v. Selectmen of Dennis, 266 Mass. 329, 336, 165 N.E. 410, 
412 (1929); Moore v. Sanford, 151 Mass. 285, 287, 24 N.E. 323 (1890). In Raimondo, 
1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2238, 319 N.E.2d at 897, the Court also indicated that the plain-
tiff could bring her petition for an assessment of damages under the two year statute of 
limitations contained in G.L. c. 79, § 16, even though she would also have had six 
months from the termination of her equity suit within which to bring the petition 
under G.L. c. 79, § 18. 
• 213 Mass. 483, 100 N.E. 641 (1913). 
10 268 Mass. 497, 168 N.E. 78 (1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 732 (1950). 
11 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2238, 319 N.E.2d at 897 (emphasis added). 
12Jd. 
§19.19. 1 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 2153, 319 N.E.2d 921. 
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preted the 1969 amendment2 to section 35 of chapter 79 of the Gen-
eral Laws. 3 In an action for the determination of damages sustained 
because of a taking by eminent domain,4 section 35 allows as evidence 
of the value of the property taken, the tax assessment placed on the 
property for the three years preceding the taking. 5 The 1969 
amendment permits this evidence only if a "comprehensive revalua-
tion" of the town's real estate has occurred within the "five years pre-
ceding" the three years preceding the taking. 
In Stewart, the petitioner's property had been taken in 1971.6 The 
estimated fair market value of the property was $24,000. 7 The town 
offered as evidence the assessed valuation of the property for the 
years 1968 to 1970, which valuation was $18,200.8 There had been a 
comprehensive revaluation of the town's real estate in 1968. The 
superior court excluded the evidence of the assessed valuation be-
cause the revaluation had not been "implemented within the five 
years ( 1963 through 1967) preceding the three years ( 1968 through 
1970) next preceding the year of the taking (1971)."9 
The Appeals Court affirmed the ruling, insisting on strict com-
pliance with the requirements of section 35. The court acknowledged 
the town's argument that "the purpose of the 1969 proviso was to in-
sure a reasonably current relationship between the assessed valuation 
and the fair market value of the property taken .... "10 The court's 
ruling appears to defeat that purpose, however, because it excludes an 
assessment from evidence where the revaluation was made one to 
three years before the taking, but allows such evidence where the re-
valuation was made four to eight years before the taking. The court, 
however, insisted that the language and legislative history of section 
35 are " 'plain, and therefore, it is to be interpreted in accordance 
with the usual and natural meaning of ... (its) words.' "11 The deci-
2 Acts of 1969, c. 209, amending G.L. c. 79, § 35. 
3 G.L. c. 79, § 35, reads in part: 
The valuation made by the assessors of a town for the purposes of taxation for the 
three years next preceding the date of the taking . . . may ... be introduced as 
evidence of the fair market value of the real estate by any party to the suit; pro-
vided, however, that if the valuation for any one year is so introduced, the valua-
tions for all three years shall be introduced in evidence; and provided further, that no 
such valuation shall be so introduced as evidence unless within the five years preceding said 
three years next preceding such taking ... there has been a comprehensive revaluation of the 
real estate in the town. 
(emphasized language added by the 1969 amendment). 
4 Such suits are allowed by G.L. c. 79, § 14. 
5 See, e.g., Haven v. Town of Brimfield, 345 Mass. 529, 531-32, 188 N.E.2d 574, 576 
(1963); Wenton v. Commonwealth, 335 Mass. 78, 81, 138 N.E.2d 609, 6ll (1956). 
6 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2153, 319 N.E.2d at 921. 
7 /d. at 2155 n.2, 319 N.E.2d at 922 n.2. 
8 /d. 
9 /d. at 2154-55, 319 N.E.2d at 922. 
10 Id. at 2155, 319 N.E.2d at 922. 
"I d. at 2156, 319 N .E.2d at 922. 
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sion indicates that the court will not second guess the Legislature 
when a statute is unambiguous, even if the result seems contrary to 
the underlying purpose of the legislation. 
§19.20. Eminent Domain: Assessment of Damages. In Colonial 
Acres, Inc. v. North Reading, 1 the Appeals Court affirmed the tradi-
tional rule that the owner of land taken by eminent domain has a 
right to recover as damages its fair market value considered in light of 
the "highest and best use to which the land could reasonably be put."2 
The petitioner's land was situated in a residentially zoned district. 3 
Three years before the taking, the town's refuse disposal committee 
obtained a special permit to use the land as a sanitary landfill.4 In an 
action for assessment of damages under section 14 of chapter 79 of 
the General Laws, petitioner presented two arguments in support of 
his assertion that the value of the land should have been based on its 
suitability for a sanitary landfill, its highest and best use. First, he ar-
gued that the special permit granted to the refuse disposal committee 
ran with the land and consequently, the fair market value should re-
flect the ability of the petitioner or a purchaser to use the land as a 
sanitary landfill.5 Secondly, petitioner maintained that there was a 
reasonable probability that the town would remove the residential zon-
ing restriction and consequently, the fair market value should reflect 
the probability that the petitioner or a purchaser could use the land as 
a sanitary landfill.6 
In rejecting the first argument, the court held that the special per-
mit granted to the refuse disposal committee did not run with the 
land, but rather ran only to the town. 7 The circumstances surround-
ing the issuance of the special permit supported this view. The refuse 
disposal committee had petitioned for the permit. The permit was 
granted with the stipulation that a group containing at least three 
town officials be appointed to oversee the operation of the landfill 
process. 8 In addition, the town had been considering taking the prop-
erty by eminent domain, and the refuse disposal committee's special 
permit was merely a preliminary step in the complete conversion of 
the land to the town's use. 9 Most significantly, the special permit was 
issued under a section of the town's zoning by-law allowing special 
§19.20. 1 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 945, 331 N.E.2d 549. 
2 !d. at 947, 331 N.E.2d at 550. Accord, Ford v. Worcester, 339 Mass. 657, 662-63, 162 
N.E.2d 264, 268-69 (1959). 
3 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 946, 331 N.E.2d at 550. 
4 !d. The court did not indicate what the petitioner received for allowing the refuse 
disposal committee to use his land as a sanitary landfill for three years. 
5 !d. 
6 !d. at 948-49, 331 N.E.2d at 551. 
7 !d. at 946, 331 N.E.2d at 550. 
8 !d. at 947, 331 N.E.2d at 550. The group had to contain at least one member from 
the town's Board of Selectmen, Board of Public Works, and Board of Health. /d. 
9 I d. 
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permits for residential areas if the land is to be used for a "municipal 
use.'' 10 Thus, the court concluded that, while the land was well-suited 
for a sanitary landfill, such use was available only to the refuse dis-
posal committee, and the petitioner's damages had to be based upon 
the property's value as residential land. 
In rejecting the second argument-that there was a reasonable 
probability the residential zoning restriction would be removed"-the 
court indicated that the trial judge has a "margin of ultimate discre-
tion" in determining whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant 
submitting the issue to the jury.'2 The court found that the mere 
grant of a special permit to the town's refuse disposal committee was 
not highly probative of a probable zonin~ change. 13 Since this was the 
only proof offered relating to the probability of such a zoning change, 
the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in prohibiting evidence of 
the land's value as a sanitary landfill. 14 
§19.21. Government Land Bank. During the 1975 Survey year, 
the General Court, in chapter 212 of the Acts of 1975, created a "land 
bank" with the power to purchase, maintain, and dispose of lands 
formerly used for the Westover Air Force Base, the Chelsea Naval 
Hospital, and the Boston Naval Shipyard, including the South Boston 
Annex and the Boston Army Base. 1 The land bank has two purposes: 
(1) to aid in the conversion of these lands to nonmilitary uses in order 
to prevent blight, economic dislocation, and unemployment; and (2) 
to aid in the construction of low and moderate income housing on 
these lands in order to alleviate the shortage of such housing. 2 
Among the Land Bank Act's many provisions, the most interesting 
deal with the Legislature's attempt to insure some local control over 
the lands comprising these three military bases. under section 
3,3 three "advisory boards," one for each base, are to be created. The 
chief executive officers of the municipalities in which the lands are lo-
cated may appoint a specified number of board members. The 
boards' function is to advise the bank's board of directors in its deci-
sions affecting the land. 4 Section 55 provides that if a municipality in 
which an installation lies desires to acquire the land when vacated by 
10 !d. 
11 A similar argument was unsuccessful in Skyline Homes, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 
362 Mass. 684, 686-88, 290 N.E.2d 160, 162-63 (1972). 
12 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 948-49, 331 N.E.2d at 551, quoting Skyline Homes, 
Inc. v. Commonwealth, 362 Mass. 684, 687, 290 N.E.2d 160, 162 (1972). 
13 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 949, 331 N .E.2d at 551. 
14 /d. 
§19.21. 1 Acts of 1975, c. 212, §§ 4UJ, 5, & 6. 
2 /d. § I. 
3 !d. § 3. 
4 !d. 
5 /d. § 5. 
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the military, the state land bank must wait one year before offering or 
bidding for it. 6 Finally, under section 6, 7 the bank cannot approve a 
redevelopment plan within two years after acquiring the land unless 
the plan is approved by the municipality in which the land lies.8 The 
statute expires on June 30, 1980.9 
D. RENT CoNTRoL 
When rent control is adopted by a city or town, a local board or 
administrator is charged with its implementation and enforcement. 
During the 1975 Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court clarified the 
extent of this local authority. 
§19.22. Rent Control: Revocation of Acceptance. In Chisholm v. 
City Council of Lynn, 1 the Supreme Judicial Court held that a city 
council could revoke a city's acceptance of rent control, even where 
the city's voters had previously approved rent control in a special 
referendum. 2 Section 2 of the Rent Control Act3 provides that a city 
or town may accept rent control by a vote of the city council and that 
"a city or town ... may, in like manner, revoke its acceptance."4 The 
Lynn City Council, while accepting rent control, petitioned the Legis-
lature for permission to conduct a city-wide referendum on the "ques-
tion of the further continuance of Rent Control in Lynn."5 The Gen-
eral Court authorized the referendum, 6 and in November, 1972, the 
6 The bank need not wait the full year, however, if it appears to the bank's board of 
directors that the lands may be acquired by someone other than the appropriate munic-
ipality. !d. 
7 Id. § 6. 
" The two-year period may be extended by the bank upon petition by the municipal-
ity. Id. 
"Id. § 19. Sections !6A-16E set forth the procedures to be followed upon the termi-
nation of the land bank. 
§19.22. 1 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2262, 331 N.E.2d 529. 
2 !d. at 2266, 331 N .E.2d at 531. 
3 Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 2. 
4 /d. (emphasis added). Section 2 does not actually specify that the procedure for ac-
ceptance is a vote by the city council. G.L. c. 4, § 4, however, provides that where a 
statute requires the "acceptance" of a city or town to be effective, a vote by the city 
council is the proper means of acceptance. See Chisholm, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2263-64 
& n.4, 331 N.E.2d at 530 & n.4. 
5 Chisholm, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2264, 331 N.E.2d at 530, quoting Order of the 
Lynn City Council of Feb. 22, 1972. 
6 Acts of 1972, c. 625. The Act authorized the use of the following ballot: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of chapter eight hundred and forty-two of the acts 
of nineteen hundred and seventy, the following question shall be placed on the of-
ficial ballot to be used at the state election to be held in the current year:--
Shall rent control be continued in the city of Lynn? Yes No 
If a majority of the votes cast on said question is in the affirmative, rent control 
shall be continued in said city subject to the provisions of said chapter eight hundred and 
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Lynn residents voted 22,000 to 15,000 to continue rent control in the 
city. 7 In June, 1974, a successor city council voted to abolish rent con-
trol. The mayor subsequently approved that decision. The plaintiffs, 
four low income tenants residing in Lynn, contended that the June 
decision of the city council did not terminate rent control in the city.8 
The Supreme Judicial Court reasoned that the city council's vote 
would be effective under section 2 unless the city-wide referendum 
"made a difference."9 The Court found that the referendum did not 
make a difference because it provided that rent control, if approved, 
would continue under the provisions of chapter 842 of the Acts of 
1970.10 Since the section 2 revocation procedures are part of chapter 
842, the Court reasoned that the referendum left the city council's au-
thority unaltered.U 
The Court rejected the plaintiffs' three arguments for a finding 
that the referendum did in fact "make a difference." First, the plain-
tiffs argued that rent control had been accepted in Lynn through 
both a city council vote and a city-wide referendum. Consequently, a 
revocation of acceptance in like manner, as required by section 2,12 
needed a city-wide referendum as well.13 The Court, however, found 
that the referendum concerned whether to continue rent control in 
Lynn, not whether to accept it. 14 Second, the plaintiffs argued that 
the referendum altered the manner .of revocation because if the vot-
ers had rejected rent control, it would have been revoked without the 
need for any action by the city council. 15 The Court, while conceding 
that the argument might be true, found that it did not aid the plain-
tiffs because the voters had in fact approved rent control, including 
the section 2 revocation procedures. 1 Third, the plaintiffs argued 
that "fairness" required a city-wide vote prior to revocation because 
the earlier vote indicated popular support for rent control. 17 The 
Court, however, refused to go beyond the legislative revocation provi-
sions. The Court concluded that the plaintiffs had "no remedy by 
litigation;" their only means of reestablishing rent control in Lynn was 
"political and legislative."18 
forty-two, and if a majority of the votes cast on said question is in the negative, rent 
control shall be discontinued in said city forthwith (emphasis added). 
7 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2266, 331 N.E.2d at 530. 
8 Id., 331 N.E.2d at 531. 
9 /d. 
10 I d. See text of referendum ballot set out in note 6 supra. 
11 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2226, 331 N.E.2d at 531. 
12 See text at note 4 supra. 
13 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2267, 331 N.E.2d at 531. 
14 /d. See text of referendum ballot set out in note 6 supra. 
15 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2267, 331 N.E.2d at 531. 
18 I d. 
17 /d. at 2268, 331 N.E.2d at 531. 
18 I d. 
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By insisting upon strict compliance with the Rent Control Act, 
Chisholm may appear to defeat the purpose of the special referendum 
authorized by the General Court for Lynn. The Legislature sus-
pended the operation of chapter 842 in order for Lynn voters to indi-
cate their acceptance or rejection of rent control. That vote was in-
tended to be binding, whatever its results. The Court's decision, how-
ever, was a proper one. If the Legislature intended that the Lynn vot-
ers should retain control over the continuation of rent control, such 
extended authority should have been explicitly granted. Instead, the 
referendum reinstated the administrative procedures outlined in 
chapter 842. The Court's consideration was limited to that statute. 
The voters' recourse was through the Legislature, not through the 
Court. 
§19.23. Rent Control: Applicability of Rollback Provision to 
Pre-Existing Leases. Under section 6 of the Rent Control Act,l the 
rollback provision, the maximum rent that may be charged for a con-
trolled rental unit is "the rent charged the occupant for the month six 
months prior to the acceptance of [the] Act by a municipality." In 
Huard v. Forest Street Housing, Inc., 2 the Supreme Judicial Court held 
that the rollback provision is applicable to a lease entered into before 
the effective date of rent control in a city, 3 and that the rollback pro-
vision, as interpreted, does not violate the constitutional prohibition 
against the impairment of the obligation of a contract.4 
In July, 1970, the plaintiff-tenant signed a written lease for a Cam-
bridge apartment owned by the defendant-landlord. 5 The term of the 
lease was from August 1, 1970 to August 31, 1971. Subject to a tax 
escalation clause, the rent was $200 per month. The lease also pro-
vided for a $200 security deposit. On September 17, 1970, two 
months after the lease was signed, Cambridge adopted rent control. 
The rollback rent for the plaintiffs apartment, which was a controlled 
rental unit, was $175 per rnonth.6 The plaintiffs November rent 
would have been the first controlled rental payment, 7 but in October, 
1970, the city ordered "that the rollback rent not be implemented ... 
until December 1, 1970."8 In November, 1970, the plaintiff paid $200 
§ 19.23. 1 Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 6. 
2 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1393, 316 N.E.2d 505. 
3 !d. at 1396, 316 N.E.2d at 507. 
4 !d. at 1397, 316 N .E.2d at 508. See U.S. CoN ST. art. I, § I 0, d. I. 
5 The statement of facts contained in this paragraph comes from id. at 1393-95, 316 
N .E.2d at 506-08. 
6 This was the rent charged the occupant as of March, 1970, which was six months 
before the city's acceptance of rent control in September, 1970. 
7 Under Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 2, the Act takes effect "on the thirtieth day following 
acceptance of its provisions" by a locality. Since this day fell on October 17, 1970, 
November was the first month for which the rollback rent was applicable. 
8 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1394, 316 N.E.2d at 506, quoting Order of Cambridge Rent 
Administrator of Oct., 1970. 
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rent. From December, 1970 to April, 1971, inclusive, he paid the roll-
back rent of $175. The city then adjusted the maximum allowable 
rent for the plaintiffs apartment to $209 per month, effective May 1, 
1971. The plaintiff, not seeking review of that ruling, paid $200 rent 
for the months of May through August, 1971.9 The plaintiff vacated 
the premises at the end of the leased term, leaving the apartment un-
damaged. In September, 1971, the defendant-landlord claimed $44 
under the lease's tax escalation clause and suggested that an additonal 
$466 might be owing if the Rent Control Act was found inapplicable 
to leases entered into before the effective date of the Act.l 0 The 
defendant-landlord offered to settle his potential claims for $360, with 
the security deposit applied against the plaintiffs obligation. In April, 
1972, the plaintiff filed suit seeking, among other relief, the return of 
his security deposit and a refund of the rent paid in excess of the 
rollback rent ($175) for the months of November, 1970, and May 
through August, 1971_11 The district court denied his claims on the 
ground that the rent rollback provision of the Rent Control Act did 
not apply to a pre-existing lease. The superior court affirmed this rul-
ing, and the plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court. 
The Supreme Judicial Court, in reversing the lower courts' rulings, 
found the rent rollback provision applicable to a pre-existing lease. 12 
The Court agreed with the defendant-landlord's proposition that stat-
utes affecting substantive rights, such as the rollback provision of the 
Rent Control Act, are given prospective application in the absence of 
a contrary legislative intent.13 The Court discerned in the Rent Con-
trol Act, however, a legislative intent that all controlled rental units in 
a municipality "be subject to [the terms of the Rent Control Act] im-
mediately on the effectiveness of the ... Act in that municipality."14 
Applying the rollback provision only to leases entered into after the 
adoption of the Act would be "inconsistent with the purposes of rent 
control"15 and would result in the inequity of some tenants having 
their rents rolled back and others not, depending entirely upon the 
9 The plaintiff's rent did not exceed $200 because that was the maximum amount 
called for in the lease. 
10 As the Court noted, the $466 claimed by the landlord "inexplicably" exceeded the 
amount attributable to the difference between the rollback and agreed rentals. 1974 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1395 n.5, 316 N.E.2d at 506 n.5. 
11 The plaintiffs refund claim was based on the contentions that the city's attempted 
delay of the effeaive date of rent control from November to December, 1970 was inef-
fective, and that the city's adjustment of the maximum allowable rent in May, 1971 was 
invalid. See text at notes 26-37 infra. 
12 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1396, 316 N.E.2d at 507. 
13 Id. For cases supporting this proposition, see, e.g., Hein-Werner Corp. v. Jackson 
Indus. Inc., 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 53, 54-55, 306 N.E.2d 440, 442-43; Yates v. General 
Motors Acceptance Corp., 35f? Mass. 529, 531, 254 N.E.2d 785, 787 (1969); Hanscom v. 
Melrose Gas-Light Co., 220 Mass. 1, 3, 107 N.E. 426, 427, (1914). 
14 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1396, 316 N.E.2d at 507. 
ts I d. 
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effective date of their leases. 16 Furthermore, since chapter 842 had 
been enacted as an emergency measure, 17 its immediate implementa-
tion was essential. 18 
The Court then found that this interpretation of the rent rollback 
provision did not violate the constitutional prohibition against the im-
pairment of the obligation of a contract. 19 The Court indicated that 
the United States Supreme Court has held that where a public 
emergency in housing exists, "any rights contained in a private con-
tract must yield to rational legislative protection of the public 
interest."20 Therefore, since the defendant in Huard did not deny the 
existence of a housing emergency, the application of the rollback pro-
vision to pre-existing leases would be upheld if rationally related to 
the protection of the public interest. Noting that the Rent Control Act 
provided for the administrative adjustment of rents and for judicial 
review, the Court found that the legislative scheme did not unreason-
ably impair the obligations of pre-existing leases21 and, therefore, by 
implication, that the scheme was rationally related to the elmination of 
the housing emergency. 
The Court then considered whether the plaintiff-tenant in the case 
before it was entitled to the return of his security deposit and the re-
fund of excess rent. The Court remanded both issues to the superior 
court because the stipulation of facts omitted "significant 
information."22 However, the Court did make "observations" about 
both claims to guide the lower court. 
In relation to the claim for the return of the security deposit, the 
Court noted that the plaintiff-tenant "appears to be entitled to recover 
the security deposit of $200."23 The plaintiff, however, was also seek-
ing damages under section 1l(a) of the Rent Control Act,24 which 
provides for treble damages where any rent demanded, accepted, or 
received exceeds the maximum lawful rent. Therefore, if the 
defendant-landlord treated the retained security deposit as "rent," he 
could be subject to the section 1l(a) penalties.25 
In relation to the claim for a refund of rent paid in excess of $17 5 
for the months of November, 1970 and May through August, 1971, 
the Court first rejected the defendant-landlord's contention that even 
16Jd. 
17 Acts of 1970, c. 842, § I. 
16 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1396, 316 N.E.2d at 507. 
19 /d. at 1397, 316 N.E.2d at 508. 
20 Id., 316 N.E.2d at 507, citing, e.g., Edgar A. Leary Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 
242, 248-49 (1922); Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170, 198 (1921); 
Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156-57 (1921). See also Twentieth Century Ass'n. Inc. v. 
Waldman, 294 N.Y. 571, 63 N.E.2d 177 (1945), appeal dismissed, 326 U.S. 697 (1946). 
21 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1397, 316 N.E.2d at 508. 
22 /d. at 1398, 316 N.E.2d at 508. 
23 /d. at 1401, 316 N.E.2d at 509-10. 
24 Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 11(a). 
25 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1401, 316 N.E.2d at 510. 
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if excess rent was received, the tenant could not recover because the 
amounts were paid voluntarily and without fraud. 26 The Court held 
that section 11 27 provides a tenant with a "clear statutory remedy," 
regardless of any common law rights, for the recovery of excess rental 
pyaments. 28 The Court then considered whether excessive rent was, in 
fact, received. The Court pointed out that there was an overpayment 
of $25 for November, 1970.29 The city's attempt to postpone the ef-
fective date of the Rent Control Act was ineffective. 30 Once accepted 
by a city, the Rent Control Act does not allow local discretion with re-
spect to its effective date. The plaintiff, however, could not recover 
the November, 1970 overpayment because he did not bring suit until 
April, 1972. Under section 11(c) of the Rent Control Act, 31 recovery 
of liquidated damages is subject to a one-year statute of limitations,32 
and refunds for rental overpayments are considered liquidated 
damages. 33 The landlord's receipt of the $200 payments for May 
through August, 1971 could possibly be justified by the city's April, 
1971 redetermination of maximum allowable rents. The plaintiff, 
however, argued that the Court, in Rent Control Board of Cambridge v. 
Gifford, 34 invalidated rent adjustments made by the Cambridge rent 
control administrator and, therefore, the maximum allowable rent re-
mained $175 a month.35 The Court pointed out, however, that even if 
the April 1971 increase was invalid under Gifford, 36 the landord 
would have been entitled to a redetermination of the requested in-
crease pursuant to proper standards. 37 
The Huard decision appears to be a well-considered reading of the 
Rent Control Act. The decision assures that all tenants occupying con-
trolled premises are afforded the benefits of rent control once the 
measure is implemented. The decision also acknowledges the right of 
landlords in the proper circumstances to collect the maximum rents 
allowed by the local rent control board or administrator. This bal-
anced interpretation of chapter 842 assures that neither landlords nor 
tenants can take unfair advantage of its provisions. 
§19.24. Rent Control: Condominiums. Under section 9(b) of the 
28 /d. at 1398, 316 N.E.2d at 508. 
27 Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 11. 
28 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1398, 316 N.E.2d at 508. 
29 /d. at 1398-99, 316 N.E.2d at 508-09. 
30 /d. 
31 Acts of 1970, c. 842, § ll(c). 
32 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1399, 316 N.E.2d at 509. 
33 /d. 
34 362 Mass. 870, 285 N.E.2d 449 (1972) (rescript opinion). 
35 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1400, 316 N.E.2d at 509. 
38 In Huard, the Court indicates that in Gifford no consideration was given to the ef-
fect of that decision on all rent increases previously approved by the Cambridge rent 
control administrator. /d. 
37 Id. 
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Rent Control Act, 1 a landlord must obtain a "certificate of eviction" 
from the local rent control board before recovering possession of a 
controlled rental unit. 2 The grounds on which a local rent control 
board may issue such certificates are specified in section 9(a). 3 In 
Zussman v. Rent Control Board of Brookline, the Supreme Judicial Court 
held that conversion of controlled rental units into condominiums 
may be ')ust cause" for the issuance of a certificate of eviction under 
section 9(a)(l0),5 and that local rent control board regulations for the 
issuance of certificates of eviction are invalid if their "purpose and ef-
fect [is] preventing the conversion of controlled rental units into 
condominiums."6 ·-
The plaintiff in Zussman, a Brookline landlord, owned 56 apart-
ments subject to rent control. With the intention of turning these 
units into condominiums, the plaintiff recorded master condominium 
deeds for the premises, 7 made extensive improvements in the 
premises, 8 and executed purchase and sale agreements with purchas-
ers who were not tenants and who intended to occupy the units. 9 
Each tenant was extended a preferential offer to buy which included 
a price lower than that offered to the public, favorable financing, and 
a repurchase option if the tenant was dissatisfied. 1 0 Any tenant not 
desiring to purchase was given a full year to vacate. 
§ 19.24. 1 Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 9(b). 
2 Section 9(b) provides in part: 
A landlord seeking to recover possession of a controlled rental unit shall apply to 
the board or administrator for a certificate of eviction .... If the board or the ad-
ministrator finds that the facts attested to in the landlord's petition are valid and in 
compliance with paragraph (a), the certificate of eviction shall be issued. 
For the text of paragraph (a) see note 3 infra. 
3 Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 9(a) provides in part: 
(a) No person shall bring any action to recover possession of a controlled rental 
unit unless: ... (6) the tenant has refused the landlord reasonable access to the 
unit for the purpose of ... showing the rental unit to any prospective purchaser 
or mortgagee; ... (8) the landlord seeks to recover possession in good faith for use 
and occupancy of himself ... ; (9) the landlord seeks to recover possession to de-
molish or otherwise remove the unit from housing use; and (10) the landlord seeks 
to recover possession for any other just cause, provided that his purpose is not in 
conflict with the provisions and purposes of this act. 
4 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1269, 326 N.E.2d 876. 
5 /d. at 1275-78, 326 N .E.2d at 878-79. 
6 /d. at 1279-80, 326 N.E.2d at 880. The Court also considered two subsidiary issues. 
The Court held that a local rent control board need not file an appeal bond under G.L. 
c. 231, § 98, because it falls within the exception for "an appeal by a county, city, town 
or other municipal corporation." 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1274, 326 N.E.2d at 378. In 
addition, the Court suggested, but did not decide, that applications for certificates of 
eviction will be subject to regulations passed by a local rent control board while the ap-
plication is pending. Id. at 1278-79, 326 N.E.2d at 879-80. 
7 Id. at 1270, 326 N.E.2d at 877. 
8 /d. at 1271, 326 N.E.2d at 877. 
9 /d. at 1270, 326 N.E.2d at 877. 
1o /d. at 1271, 326 N.E.2d at 877. 
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The plaintiff applied to the Brookline Rent Control Board for evic-
tion certificates. On August 29, 1972, the board adopted "guidelines" 
for such cases. 11 By September, 1972, the plaintiff had been granted 
two eviction certificates under these guidelines. 12 In October, 1972, 
while the plaintiff had twenty-seven applications pending, the board 
delayed further consideration until after a public hearing on the sub-
ject in November. On January 30, 1973, the board issued an 
"Emergency Regulation" for eviction certificates when conversion into 
condominiums was planned. The plaintiffs pending applications were 
denied because they did not comply with the "Emergency 
Regulation."13 The plaintiff then brought suit in the Municipal Court 
of Brookline against the board and 26 tenants. The court ordered the 
issuance of the certificates. 14 The ruling was affirmed by the superior 
court. 15 
The Supreme Judicial Court first found that the conversion of con-
trolled rental units into condominiums constitutes ')ust cause" for the 
issuance of certificates of eviction under section 9(a)(l0). 16 The Court 
reached this conclusion by discerning within various provisions of the 
Rent Control Act a policy of encouraging home ownership. 17 For ex-
ample, sections 3(b)(4) and 3(b)(6) 18 exempt cooperatives and owner-
occupied two and three-family houses from the provisions of the Rent 
Control Act. 19 Section 9(a)(8) provides that eviction is possible where 
the landlord seeks to occupy the premises himself.20 Section 9(a)(6) 
appears aimed at encouraging personal ownership by allowing evic-
tion where a tenant unreasonably refuses access to a unit that the 
landlord wishes to show to a prospective purchaser.U After pointing 
to those sections of the Act supporting a policy of personal ownership, 
the Court suggested that condominiums promote the basic purposes 
of the Act because they "offer the city dweller significant advantages 
over rental housing" and they "may be well suited to the housing 
"I d. 
12Jd. 
13 /d. The "Emergency Regulation" was replaced by a Permanent Regulation on 
March 20, 1973. /d. 
14 /d. at 1272,326 N.E.2d at 877. 
15 /d. at 1272-73, 326 N.E.2d at 877-78. 
16 /d. at 1277-78, 326 N.E.2d at 879. For the text of Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 9(a)(IO) 
see note 3 supra. 
17 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1276, 326 N.E.2d at 879. 
18 Acts of 1970, c. 842, §§ 3(b)(4) & 3(b)(6). 
19 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1276, 326 N.E.2d at 879. 
20 Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 9(a)(8). For the text of § 9(a)(8) see note 3 supra. As the 
Court pointed out, once a condominium purchaser has obtained a deed, he could ob-
tain possession under § 9(a)(8). 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1277, 326 N.E.2d at 879. Few 
people would be willing to purchase a condominium, however, without being able to 
move in immediately. See id. at 1280, 326 N.E.2d at 880. 
21 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1277, 326 N.E.2d at 879. For the text of Acts of 1970, c. 
842, § 9(a)(6) see note 3 supra. 
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problems of low income families." 22 Thus, the Court concluded that 
"home ownership in condominium form is not in conflict with [the 
Rent Control Act's] provisions or purposes."23 
Even though conversion to condominiums was held 'just cause" for 
obtaining a certificate of eviction, the Court had to consider the effect 
of the Brookline Rent Control Board's Emergency and Permanent 
Regulations, the requirements of which were not met by the plaintiffs 
applications. 24 Among other restrictions, these regulations prevented 
an owner of a controlled unit from obtaining a certificate of eviction 
in order to convert the unit into a condominium and prevented a 
condominium purchaser from obtaining a certificate of eviction unless 
he possessed a duly executed and recorded deed received for "full 
consideration paid."25 The Court found that in practice such regula-
tions would prevent the conversion of rental units into 
condominiums.26 Since preventing such conversions did not further 
the purposes of the Act, the regulations were invalidP Consequently, 
the Court affirmed the superior court decree28 which required the 
issuance of eviction certificates upon the owner's presentation of an 
executed purchase and sale agreement containing no repurchase 
clauses and the purchaser's representation that he, or members of his 
family, intend to occupy the premises. 29 
The most significant, and most troubling, aspect of Zu.ssman is the 
Court's enthusiastic support for the concept of condominium owner-
ship. While condominiums allow more people to be their own land-
lords, many people cannot afford to take advantage of condominium 
living, or may, for valid personal reasons, not wish to do so. These 
people should not be forced to forgo the protections of rent control. 
The facts of Zussman indicated that the landlord attempted to accom-
modate the needs of his present tenants. However, another apartment 
building owner in the same situation may not be so solicitous. The is-
22 I975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at I277, 326 N.E.2d at 879. 
23 /d. at I278, 326 N.E.2d at 879. In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the 
defendant's contention that Mayo v. Boston Rent Control Administrator, 1974 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 1109, 314 N.E.2d 118, noted in 1974 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§ 19.5, at 537, re-
quired a finding that the desire to create condominiums was not '1ust cause" under 
§ 9(a)(10). In Mayo, the landlord sought evictions in order to renovate his apartments 
and re-rent them at substantially increased rents. The Court found that this purpose 
was contrary to the purposes of the Act because the apartments would be removed 
from the low and moderate income market. In Zussman, the Court found no indication 
that the proposed condominiums would be beyond the reach of the landlord's present 
tenants. I975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1275-76, 326 N.E.2d at 878-79. 
24 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1279-80, 326 N.E.2d at 880. See text at notes 12-13 supra. 
25 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1280, 326 N.E.2d at 880, quoting the Brookline Rent Con-
trol Board's Permanent Regulation of March, 1973. 
26 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1280, 326 N.E.2d at 880. 
27 !d. 
28 !d. 
29 /d. at 1273 n.3, 326 N.E.2d at 877 n.3. 
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sues involved in such cases demonstrate the necessity for a careful 
balance between the rights of building owners to use their property 
and the rights of tenants as expressed in the Rent Control Act. 
§19.25. Rent Control: Scope of Judicial Review. Under section 
lO(a) of the Rent Control Act, 1 any person aggrieved by the decision 
of a local rent control board or administrator in a rent adjustment 
proceeding may obtain judicial review in the district court. The deci-
sion of the district court may be appealed to the superior court. 2 The 
statute does not, however, specify the extent to which those courts 
may reexamine a local board or administrator's rent adjustment 
decision. 3 In Sherman v. Rent Control Board of Brookline, 4 the Supreme 
Judicial Court held that the scope of judicial review of a rent adjust-
ment decision is limited to determining whether a "board's decision 
[is] supported by the facts before it and [is] legally justified."5 
The plaintiff in Sherman, a Brookline landlord, applied to the town 
rent control board for a rent increase. 6 After a hearing, the board 
denied the increase without providing any reasons for its decisions. 7 
The plaintiff appealed the board's decision under section 10(a)8 by fil-
ing a complaint against the board in the Municipal Court of Brook-
line. While the case was pending, the board issued a second decision, 
this time assigning reasons. The board found that, if Sherman were to 
receive the same percentage of return in 1971 as he had received in 
1970, his gross rental receipts should total $43,351. The board de-
nied any increase, however, because of excessive deterioration of the 
housing units, the plaintiffs failure to make necessary repairs, and the 
plaintiffs noncompliance with the sanitary code, the building code, 
and the zoning by-law.9 On August 4, 1972, the municipal court 
awarded the plaintiff a rent increase to $39,120, $4,231 less than the 
board would have allowed absent the violations. 10 
The plaintiff appealed this decision to the superior court. Examin-
ing the case de novo, the court held a hearing, heard witnesses, and 
§19.25. 1 Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 10(a). 
2 /d. 
3 See Sherman v. Rent Control Board of Brookline, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 431, 441, 
323 N.E.2d 731, 734. 
4 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 431,323 N.E.2d 731. 
5 Id. at 442, 323 N.E.2d at 735. Compare Gentile v. Rent Control Bd. of Somerville, 
1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 809, 814-15 & n.6, 312 N.E.2d 210, 215 & n.6, noted in 1974 ANN. 
SuRv. MAss. LAW § 19.5, at 532-36, where the Court found that de novo judicial review 
is required of local board's eviction decisions under § 9 of the Rent Control Act, Acts of 
1970, c. 842, § 9. 
6 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 431-32, 323 N.E.2d at 731. 
7 Id. at 432, 323 N.E.2d at 731. 
8 Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 1 O(a). 
9 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 432-33, 323 N.E.2d at 731. A local board is instructed to 
consider these and other factors by Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 7(b) & (c) when making a 
rent adjustment determination. 
10 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 433, 323 N.E.2d at 731. 
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made findings of fact. 11 The court concluded that the board's denial 
of the plaintiffs requested increase was proper. The judge proceeded 
to infer, however, from the municipal court decision that the viola-
tions leading to the denial had been corrected. Once the violations 
had been remedied, the board should have established rents which 
would have yielded the plaintiff a "fair net operating income." Using 
the percentage of return that the plaintiff was receiving in 1970, the 
judge found that the plaintiff should have been allowed rentals at an 
annual rate of $43,351 after August 4, 1972. 12 
In reversing the superior court, the Supreme Judicial Court found 
that district and superior courts may not provide de novo review of 
rent adjustment proceedings. 13 The Court reached this conclusion by 
examining the procedural and substantive restrictions placed on local 
rent control boards in rent adjustment proceedings by the Rent Con-
trol Act. 14 This examination revealed that: 
[T)he court's proper role is not to take evidence afresh and decide 
for itself what rent is to be fixed, but is rather to decide whether 
the board's decision was supported by the facts before it and was 
legally justified.15 
In relation to procedure, the Court discovered Rent Control Act 
provisions designed to safeguard the rights of parties in rent adjust-
ment proceedings before local boards. Section 8(a) of the Act16 re-
quires a board in rent adjustment proceedings, if requested by the 
tenant or landlord or if acting on its own initiative, to employ adver-
sary procedures, including notice and a hearingP Section 8(d)18 di-
rects a board to follow the procedures of sections 11( 1)-(6) of the state 
Administrative Procedures Act19 when conducting rent adjustment 
hearings. Those procedures, while not requiring the observation of 
IIJd. 
12 /d. at 434, 323 N.E.2d at 732. The superior court also found that the town of 
Brookline owed the plaintiff, as damages, the difference between the rent actually col-
lected since August 4, 1972 and the rent he should have collected. ld. at 435, 323 
N.E.2d at 732. The Supreme Judicial Court held that, regardless of the validity of the 
superior court's redetermination of the rent adjustment, its award of damages against 
the town was improper. ld. at 435-38, 323 N.E.2d at 732-33. The Court's holding was 
based on the following factors: (I) the municipal court, not the town, decided that the 
plaintiff was entitled only to $39,120; (2) the record did not indicate that all of the 
grounds for the board's decision had been remedied; (3) the town was not a party to 
the action; and (4) the town and the board members were immune from liability in 
these circumstances./d. 
13 /d. at 442, 323 N.E.2d at 735. 
14 Acts of 1970, c. 842. 
15Jd. 
16 !d. § 8(a). 
17 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 438, 323 N.E.2d at 733. 
18 Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 8(d). 
19 G.L. c. 30A, §§ 11(1)-(6). 
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formal rules of evidence, provide the parties with the right to ex-
amine witnesses and introduce evidence. 20 The presence of these pro-
cedural protections at the board level, the Court suggested, made de 
novo review at the judicial level superfluous. 21 
In relation to substance, the Court found that section 7 of the Rent 
Control Act22 allows local rent control boards considerable discretion 
in rent adjustment proceedings. Section 7(a) does establish the 
general principle that rents should be adjusted to allow landlords a 
"fair net operating income." In addition, section 7(b) stipulates several 
factors to be considered by local boards in making the 
determination. 23 Nowhere, however, does the statute indicate the rela-
tive weight to be given to these factors. 24 Also, section 7(d) gives local 
boards the discretion to deny a rent increase if it finds violations of 
sanitary or other codes and to deny a rent decrease if it finds the ten-
ant is behind in his rent. 25 Thus, the Court concluded that allowing 
de novo judicial review would be contrary to the Legislature's appar-
ent intent to rely on the informed judgment of local boards in rent 
adjustment proceedings. 26 
By limiting the scope of review in rent adjustment cases, Sherman 
reinforces the discretionary authority of local rent control boards. The 
local boards are close to the landlord-tenant relationship in the com-
munity and are well-suited to make fair, informed decisions. 
Moreover, both landlords and tenants are afforded procedural protec-
tions to assure that all arguments are heard. If judicial review is lim-
ited to a consideration of the propriety of the board's action, frivolous 
appeals will be discouraged, while good faith procedural objections 
are heard. 
E. WnLAI\DS 
§19.26. Wetlands Legislation. Massachusetts protects inland and 
coastal wetlands through two distinct statutory programs: 1 case-by-case 
20 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 438-39, 323 N.E.2d at 733-34. Although § 8(d) explicitly 
exempts rent adjustment proceedings from the G.L. c. 30A, § 11(8) statement of 
reasons requirement, the Court in Sherman indicated that boards should provide written 
statements of reasons in cases likely to reach the courts and that, in any case actually 
appealed, a court can require a board to supply a written statment of reasons. 1975 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 442-44, 323 N.E.2d at 735. 
21 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 440, 442, 323 N.E.2d at 734, 735. 
22 Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 7. 
23 These factors include: changes in property taxes; unavoidable changes in operating 
and maintenance expenses; capital improvements; changes in space, services, or 
facilities provided; substantial deterioration not the result of ordinary wear and tear; 
and failure to perform ordinary repair and maintenance. Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 7(b). 
24 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 440, 323 N.E.2d at 734. 
25 I d. 
26 Id. at 440, 442, 323 N.E.2d at 734, 735. 
§19.26. 1 See generally 1974 ANN. St:RV. MASS. LAW§ 18.8, at 460-63. 
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review2 and prospective regulation. 3 During the Survey year, the Gen-
eral Court amended both programs. 
The program of case-by-case review was amended by chapters 334 
and 363 of the Acts of 1975. Chapter 334 amended the nineteenth 
paragraph of section 40 of chapter 131 of the General Laws4 by creat-
ing a three-year statute of limitations for civil or criminal actions 
against grantees who acquire real estate upon which wetlands viola-
tions have occurred. The statute of limitations begins to run on either 
the date the deed is recorded or the date of the death by which the 
grantee acquired the land. 5 Chapter 363 of the Acts of 1975 made 
significant changes in the second, seventeenth, and eighteenth para-
graphs of section 40. 6 
The second paragraph of section 40 contains the procedure by 
which a person may obtain a written determination whether any land 
or project will be subject to the requirements of the section. The first 
change instituted by the 1975 amendment is to require a person seek-
ing such a determination to make a written request to "a conservation 
commission"7 instead of to "the conservation commission."8 This 
amendment changes the focus from a centralized state conservation 
commission to the municipal conservation commissions. Chapter 363 
of the Acts of 1975 also lengthened, from 10 to 21 days, the period 
within which a conservation commission must make the requested 
written determination. The 21-day period will be measured from the 
time a conservation commission receives a written request for a 
determination. The amendment also requires that a person send his 
written request for a determination by certified mail. 9 
The seventeenth paragraph of section 40 provides that certain work 
will be exempted from the requirements of the section. 10 Prior to the 
197 5 amendment, one such exemption was for "maintenance or im-
provement of lands for agricultural use."11 Chapter 363 modifies this 
exemption to "lands in agricultural use."12 This change eliminates 
possible claims of exemptions by. people seeking to transform land to 
an agricultural use. Under the present law, the exemption applies 
only to maintaining or improving land already in agricultural use. 
The eighteenth paragraph of section 40 provides that the state or 
local governments need not comply with the section's notice provisions 
2 G.L. c. 131, § 40 (covers both inland and coastal wetlands). 
3 G.L. c. 130, § 105 (coastal wetlands); G.L. c. 131, § 40A (inland wetlands). 
4 G.L. c. 131, § 40. 
5 /d., as amended by Acts of 1975, c. 334. 
6 G.L. c. 131, § 40. 
7 /d., as amended by Acts of 1975, c. 363, § 1 (emphasis added). 
8 Acts of 1974, c. 818 (emphasis added). 
9 G.L. c. 131, § 40, as amended by Acts of 1975, c. 363, § 1. 
10 G.L. c. 131, § 40. 
11 Acts of 1974, c. 818 (emphasis added). 
12 G.L. c. 131, § 40, as amended by Acts of 1975, c. 363, § 2 (emphasis added). 
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when performing an emergency project necessary for the protection 
of the health or safety of the Commonwealth. 13 Prior to the 1975 
amendment, the existence of such an emergency had to be certified 
by the local conservation commission and the commissioner of natural 
resources. 14 The amendment provides that this certification may now 
be made by the local conservation commission alone. 15 Although this 
seems to mark a return to local control, the amendment goes on to 
require the local officials to act favorably within 24 hours. Otherwise, 
the power to make the determination reverts back to the commis-
sioner of natural resources. 
The program of prospective regulation of wetlands was amended 
by chapter 351 of the Acts of 1975. Under section 105 of chapter 130 
of the General Laws, the commissioner of environmental management 
may promulgate orders governing the use of coastal wetlands. 16 The 
1975 amendment prohibits the issuance of such an order permitting 
the construction, in coastal wetlands, of driveways except in a manner 
that allows the flow of the tide. 17 
13 G.L. c. 131, § 40. 
14 Acts of 1974, c. 818. 
15 G.L. c. 131, § 40, as amended by Acts of 1975, c. 363, § 3. If the municipality does 
not have a conservation commission, the mayor or selectmen may certify the existence 
of the emergency. 
18 G.L. c. 130, § 105, as amended by Acts of 1975, c. 351. 
17 /d. Also during the Suroey year, the general responsibility for implementing G.L. c. 
131, § 40 and G.L. c. 130, § 105 was placed with the Department of Environmental Af-
fairs. See Acts of 1975, c. 706, §§ 220, 237-43. 
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